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ABSTRACT
The Identity and Construction of Wreck Baker:
a War of 1812 Era Royal Navy Frigate. (August 2007)
Daniel Robert Walker, B.A., McMaster University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kevin J. Crisman
The aim of this research is to determine the identity of a wooden ship located at 
the bottom of a shallow bay near Kingston, Ontario.  The wreck, designated 'Wreck 
Baker', underwent an archaeological survey, directed by the author, in 2000.  Using the 
archaeological information gathered in conjunction with historical research at the 
National Archives of Canada and in secondary sources, Wreck Baker will be identified 
as Princess Charlotte.
 On Christmas Day 1814 the frigate HMS Psyche splashed into the ice cold 
waters of Lake Ontario to take part in a war that had ended one day earlier with the 
signing of the Treaty of Ghent.  The Psyche's launch was the fourth of the year, 
following the frigates HMS Princess Charlotte, and HMS Prince Regent, and the First 
Rate HMS St. Lawrence.  Three of these four ships now rest at the bottom of Lake 
Ontario.  Two of the wrecks have been identified as St. Lawrence and Prince Regent, the 
largest ships built by the Royal Navy at Kingston.  The size and construction of the third 
wreck provide important clues to its identity.  This wreck, called both Wreck Baker and 
Deadman Bay II by previous investigators, is located, along with Prince Regent  (Wreck 
Able, Deadman Bay I) on the bottom of Deadman Bay at the north-east corner of Lake 
iv
Ontario, near Kingston, Ontario.
In the summer of 2000 an archaeological survey was undertaken with the aim of 
recording and understanding the unique construction of Wreck Baker to conclusively 
determine whether it was Princess Charlotte or Psyche.  Understanding the construction 
of Wreck Baker required dives into Lake Ontario and the National Archives of Canada. 
The work in Lake Ontario provided insight into how the ship was built and the archival 
work provided the historical context that explains the ship's novel construction.  Wreck 
Baker's archaeologically recorded shape, length, and construction were compared with 
the ships in the historical record leading to the identification of Wreck Baker as Princess 
Charlotte.
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11 INTRODUCTION 
On Christmas Day, 1814, the frigate HMS Psyche splashed into the ice cold 
waters of Lake Ontario to take part in a war that had ended one day earlier with the 
signing of the Treaty of Ghent.  The Psyche's launch was the fourth of the year following 
the frigates HMS Princess Charlotte, and HMS Prince Regent, launched together on 
April 14, and the first rate HMS St. Lawrence launched on September 10th.  Three of the 
four ships launched during 1814 now rest at the bottom of Lake Ontario.  Two of these 
wrecks have been identified as St. Lawrence and Prince Regent, the largest ships built by 
the Royal Navy at Kingston.  The third wreck, based on its size, must be either the 
frigate Princess Charlotte or Psyche.  This wreck, called both Wreck Baker and 
Deadman Bay II by previous investigators, is located, along with Prince Regent  (Wreck 
Able, Deadman Bay I) on the bottom of Deadman Bay at the north-east corner of Lake 
Ontario, near Kingston, Ontario (figure 1).  
During the war of 1812, Kingston was strategically important due both to its 
location near the point that Lake Ontario empties into the St. Lawrence River and to the 
presence of a shipyard that, after the successful American action against York (now 
Toronto, Ontario), became the focus British ship building efforts on the Great Lakes. 
Many ships were built, launched and based in Kingston during the war as the British and 
American navies on Lake Ontario became embroiled in a naval arms race that escalated 
wildly during the three sailing seasons encompassed by the War of 1812.
 This thesis follows the style of The American Neptune.
2Figure 1. Location of the wrecks Able and Baker in Deadman Bay. (Drawing by 
Daniel Walker).
With the low population density of North America, and particularly of Upper 
Canada, there were a limited numbers of troops available and few targets worth 
attacking.  This created a situation where mobility was the key to success.  Mobility at 
this time, when there were few good roads and great distances between population 
centers, meant control of the waterways, and the most important waterway essential to 
the security of Upper Canada was Lake Ontario (figure 2).  While some attention was 
given to Lake Erie once the ship-building war began, the British focused their limited 
resources on Lake Ontario and Erie eventually fell to American forces.  It was on Lake
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4Ontario that the Royal Navy launched three frigates and a ship-of-the-line during the 
sailing season of 1814 and by the end of the war both the American and British yards had 
ships on the stocks to rival any of those sailing the oceans.  
In the summer of 2000 an archaeological survey was undertaken with the aim of 
recording and understanding the unique construction of Wreck Baker in order to 
conclusively identify it.  Understanding the construction of Wreck Baker required dives 
into both Lake Ontario and the National Archives of Canada.  The work in Lake Ontario 
provided insight into how the ship was built and the archival work provided the 
historical context that explained the reasons behind the ship's novel construction. 
Together, the archaeological and historical records shed light on the identity of Wreck 
Baker.
The archaeological work revealed unique features that, along with the heavy 
framing, indicate the frigate design and construction were adapted to local conditions 
recounted in the historical record.  The length of the ship, along with the presence of the 
larger Wreck Able in the same bay, leave only two possible identities for Wreck Baker: 
Psyche or Princess Charlotte.  The following study of the archaeological and historical 
evidence proves the ship to be Princess Charlotte
.
52 BACKGROUND HISTORY
2.1 Napoleonic Wars
During the two decades of conflict in Europe prior to the War of 1812 the British 
achieved naval supremacy on the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea through 
victories at the battles of St. Vincent and Trafalgar over their numerically superior 
French and Spanish enemies.  In 1797, at the battle of St. Vincent, Sir John Jervis and 
Horatio Nelson were able to defeat a larger Spanish force and quell any plans their 
enemies had for an invasion of England through Ireland.  Later, at the Battle of Trafalgar 
in1805, the British handed the allied Spanish and French navies an even more 
devastating defeat.  Although the British had only 27 ships-of-the-line against the 33 
French and Spanish ships-of-the- line, they managed to capture 17 enemy ships during 
the battle.  This spoke to both the superiority of the Royal Navy over its enemies and the 
brilliance of Nelson who was fatally injured during the battle.
On land, France and its allies were sweeping all obstacles before them.  In 
response to the Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806, which allowed for the seizure of 
British goods entering ports under Napoleon’s control, the British enacted a new series 
of Orders in Council that declared any vessel entering a continental port without first 
going to the British Isles would be viewed as an enemy.1  Through a blockade of 
European ports the Royal Navy attempted to keep all French vessels trapped and to 
prevent military supplies from reaching French forces.
 In order to enforce this embargo the British searched the ships of neutral states, 
6such as those of the United States, for contraband heading to France, a tactic that 
infuriated the neutral American merchants as it restricted their trade and forced upon 
them the indignity of having the British board their vessels.  To make matters worse 
many British captains used this opportunity to remove from the American vessels any 
man they suspected of being a British deserter.2
Blockading the ports of the French and their allies put great stress on the ships 
and seamen of the Royal Navy and the necessity of keeping so many ships on station 
resulted in a shortage of sailors. This lead many Royal Navy captains to be less 
discriminating than they should have been in determining who they pressed into service 
from American merchant ships.  It must be remembered, however, that during this period 
there were no universally recognized documents of nationality equal to modern passports 
and there was very little difference between the accent of an American and a British 
citizen.3  
To further complicate matters the American and British governments had 
different ideas of what constituted citizenship.  The British considered anyone born in 
Britain to be a British citizen and there was no way out of it.  The United States, whose 
citizens included many recent immigrants, had a less strict idea of citizenship and 
allowed anyone who had lived in the United States for a period of five years the rights of 
American citizenship.4  The impressing of sailors on American merchantmen, while 
occasionally justified, was sometimes abused by British captains wanting to make up for 
shortfalls in crews stretched thin by the European blockade.  Animosity left over from 
7the American Revolution also played a role in the actions of many British captains who 
had an American merchantman to leeward.  These actions understandably increased the 
resentment America felt towards Britain.
Kindling was thrown on the smoldering resentment on June 22, 1807 when 
Captain Salusbury P. Humphreys of the HMS Leopard of 50 guns intercepted the 38-gun 
frigate Chesapeake and demanded that she be searched for deserters from the British 
squadron.  The request was refused by Captain James Barron and the British frigate fired 
on the unprepared Chesapeake, forcing it to comply.  Chesapeake struck its colors, was 
boarded by the British, and four seamen were taken to Leopard.  Insult was added to the 
casualties (three killed and 18 injured), when the British refused to take Chesapeake as a 
prize.  The British Government later apologized for the incident but the damage had been 
done.5 
The American Congress responded to these actions and the British Orders in 
Council by passing the Embargo Act in 1807 that banned American trade with foreign 
nations.  The Embargo Act hurt the American economy, particularly that of the New 
England states whose economies were heavily weighted towards trade and the fisheries. 
It was replaced in 1809 by the Non-Intercourse Act, which reopened trade with neutral 
nations and authorized the President to renew trade with Britain and/or France if they 
agreed to respect America’s right as a neutral country to trade with whomever they 
pleased.6  Neither the British nor the French could afford to do this, as the conflict in 
Europe weighed more heavily upon their policy making than did the discontent of the 
8United States.  While on paper the Berlin Decree and the Orders in Council were equally 
disrespectful of America’s neutral status, the British Royal Navy was better positioned to 
enforce its will than were the French ships bottled up in port by blockade.  This situation, 
and the underlying animosity left over from the Revolutionary War, led to many more 
American confrontations with Britain than with France.  When the Embargo and Non-
Intercourse Acts failed to resolve the situation, attitudes in America became further 
inflamed and the two nations moved closer to war.7
A further outcry went up in the United States when it was learned that on May 1, 
1811 HMS Guerriere had impressed men from an American coastal vessel.  The United 
States Navy frigate President subsequently mistook the much smaller HMS Little Belt, a 
British sloop, for the HMS Guerriere and took revenge for earlier British transgressions 
by inflicting serious damage.8
2.2 War of 1812
On the first of June 1812  President James Madison requested from Congress the 
declaration of war, which he received on June 18.  The decision for war may have been 
influenced by the notion that, as much of its population had recently arrived from the 
United States, Upper Canada could be easily conquered.  Madison's predecessor Thomas 
Jefferson voiced a common American opinion at the time when he stated that, “the 
acquisition of Canada this year ... will be a mere matter of marching”9  The declaration 
of war caught both sides unprepared for the conflict at hand.  In January 1812, the 
American Congress had approved the recruitment of ten new regiments of infantry, two 
9of artillery, and one of light dragoons but by June the enlistment was far below 
expectations.10  After declaring war, Congress set the the war establishment at twenty-
five regiments of infantry, four of artillery, two of dragoons, and one of riflemen, totaling 
36,700 men including engineers and artificers.11  At this time there were less than 10,000 
enlisted men available and 4,000 of these were new recruits.12  
The citizens of Upper and Lower Canada (figure 3) realized that the Americans, 
lacking the capability of launching overseas offensives, would likely concentrate their 
war efforts against Canada.13  The British, focused on Napoleon in Europe, were no 
better prepared for the conflict in North America than were the Americans.  Upper 
Canada, with its capital at York, had a population of fewer than 80,000 and of the 
approximately 7,000 British Army regulars in North America, 5,000 were stationed in 
Lower Canada, leaving only about 2,000 for the defense of Upper Canada.14  The 2,000 
men serving in Upper Canada had the good fortune early in the war to be led by a man 
who proved to be a most capable military officer, General Isaac Brock. 
On July 12, 1812 Brigadier-General William Hull crossed the Detroit River and 
made the first American advance onto Canadian soil.  He captured the village of 
Sandwich without resistance and issued a proclamation that demonstrated the light in 
which the Americans saw the citizens of Upper Canada.  The proclamation stated;
Raise not your hands against your brethren, many of your fathers fought for the 
freedom and Independence that we now enjoy.  Being children therefore of the 
same family with us, and heirs to the same Heritage, the arrival of an army of 
Friends must be hailed by you with a cordial welcome.  You will be emancipated 
from Tyranny and oppression and restored to the dignified state of freemen.15
10
Figure 3. Upper and Lower Canada from Quebec to Kingston. (Map by Daniel
Walker).
Some of the settlers did indeed welcome the Americans but only a few hundred 
American-born settlers returned to the United States.16  It appeared that the taking of 
British North America would take more than marching after all.
Both sides now had to determine how to act offensively and defensively in a 
largely unpopulated wilderness with few cities and a widely scattered population.  There 
11
were few points that could be attacked for great strategic gain and if these were 
successfully taken, holding them for long enough to have any effect would be extremely 
difficult amongst an antagonistic population.  The Americans and the British both 
quickly realized that the ability to move troops and supplies quickly from location to 
location was the key to the war and, therefore, control of the Great Lakes was the key to 
success in Upper Canada.
2.3 Ship Battles
To understand the shipbuilding programs that were to take place on Lake 
Ontario, it is informative to examine the battles between the American and British navies 
on the oceans and the lessons that both sides learned from these.  The tactics adopted by 
the United States Navy took advantage of its strengths while minimizing its weaknesses. 
The Americans, whose largest ships were frigates, realized that they could not hope to 
meet Britain in a naval battle involving ships of the line and instead adopted a strategy of 
attacking single warships and merchantmen.  The American heavy frigates were well 
equipped for this task, being more heavily built, armed, and manned than British frigates. 
The American efforts in the Atlantic and to a smaller extent in the Pacific targeted 
Britain’s merchant shipping and whalers.  The American frigate captains with larger 
ships and better-trained seamen also won some impressive victories over their British 
counterparts.
The first decisive encounter between American and British warships occurred on 
August 19, 1812 when Constitution encountered Guerriere.  Constitution, under the 
12
command of Captain Isaac Hull U.S.N., had been harassing British shipping along the 
North Eastern shores of North America since leaving Boston on August 2, when a 
fishing vessel out of Salem reported to Captain Hull that a British frigate was in the area. 
Fortunately for Hull, Captain James Dacres of the frigate HMS Guerriere was eager to 
engage the American frigate.  Recent history made Dacres confident that he would 
prevail, for the Royal Navy had enjoyed a period of naval superiority so profound that 
they had not lost any single ships action since 1803.  This was about to dramatically 
change.
The two frigates spent an hour exchanging long-range shots before closing in.  It 
was at this time that the more heavily built and armed Constitution showed its true value 
by knocking down the Guerriere's  mizzenmast and inflicting heavy damage.  Guerriere 
began to slow down and Constitution came about and crossed the bow of its foe, 
unleashing a raking fire that brought down the main yard.  Constitution then wore and 
passed once again across the bow of Guerriere, this time becoming tangled in the fallen 
mizzen rigging.  This mistake brought about some close fighting between the opposing 
crews that ended when the ships separated.  As the ships parted, Guerriere’s fore and 
main masts fell, leaving it a defenseless hulk.17  The loss of Guerriere to an American 
frigate sent shock waves through a Royal Navy that had come to expect easy victories.18 
It would however take two more loses for the Admiralty to understand that in many ways 
American frigates and their crews were superior to those of the British.
In the second encounter between American and British frigates, the Royal Navy 
13
fared no better.  On October 12, 1812, Captain John Carden of HMS Macedonian 
encountered the frigate United States under the command of Commodore Stephen 
Decatur.  They too began the encounter at long range, with the Americans using their 
long guns to great effect.  Carden realized Macedonian was getting the worst of it and 
tried to close in on the American vessel but, as he had earlier given up the weather-gage, 
Decatur was able to retain control of the contest.  After an hour and a half, Macedonian 
was forced to strike its colors.  Once again an American ship and its crew had proved 
superior to those fighting on behalf of Great Britain.  United States had received some 
damage to its masts and rigging but only received three shots to the hull.  Macedonian in 
contrast had received over one hundred shots in its hull and crippling damage to the 
masts and rigging.  The casualty lists provide further proof of the disparity, with the 
British suffering 104 casualties and the Americans only 11.19 
Samuel Leech, a crewman aboard Macedonian, reported after being taken aboard 
United States that: “when we came to close action, the shot from the United States went 
‘through and through’ our ship, while ours struck her side and fell harmlessly into the 
water.  This is to be accounted for both by the superiority of the metal and of the ship. 
Her guns were heavier and her sides thicker than ours.”20  The scantlings of the American 
frigates were equal in size to those found in the British 74’s and this, combined with the 
heavier metal they carried and the larger better trained crews, made them far superior to 
the undermanned, under trained, and more lightly built British frigates.
The British were to lose one more frigate to the United States Navy in the first 
14
six months of the war.  On December 29, 1812 the Royal Navy frigate Java, commanded 
by Captain Henry Lambert, encountered Captain William Bainbridge's frigate 
Constitution, off the coast of Brazil.  This battle started better for the British, with Java 
unleashing a devastating broadside into Constitution.  The Java and Constitution then 
played cat-and-mouse with each other, Java using its superior speed to good advantage. 
The battle turned when Java lost the end of its bowsprit and its jib boom to heavy fire 
from Constitution.  Constitution next fired a broadside into the stern of Java.  When the 
two ships closed again, Constitution's gunnery once more got the best of Java, knocking 
away parts of the maintop and foremasts and forcing the British to attempt a boarding 
during which they were cut down by American grape and musket shot.  At this point the 
vessels pulled away from each other and the battle was all but over.  The British fought 
on until Java was little more than a hulk.21  
While the American frigate victories did little to weaken the overall strength of 
the Royal Navy, they had a disproportionate effect on the populations at home.  The 
British were unused to naval defeat and considered their navy to possess the most skilled 
crews, and were therefore dismayed by the losses.22  In America the victories served to 
strengthen support for the war by showing the population that the Royal Navy was not 
invincible.23  While American privateers and the Navy's heavy frigates did annoy the 
British, they were not sufficient to force Britain to change its attitude towards the 
removal of suspected deserters from American vessels.  The American victories were 
won by ships that as well as being arguably better manned were also much more heavily 
15
built than the Royal Navy’s ships and were able to withstand attacks that would likely 
have crippled the ships of any other of the world's navies at this time.  
The building program that produced the American super-frigates was overseen by 
Joshua Humphreys, who anticipated that if it were not possible to compete numerically 
with many of the powerful preexisting navies, the ships built by America should be 
superior in every way to their foreign counterparts.  Humphreys therefore decided to 
build the United States Navy's frigates with scantlings equal to those found on Britain's 
74’s.24
It appears that by the time shipbuilding on Lake Ontario had escalated to the level 
where frigates were being built at the Kingston Naval Yard, the Royal Navy in Upper 
Canada had learned a lesson in ship building from the United States Navy.  On Lake 
Ontario both navies raced to build the largest, most heavily built and armed ships 
possible.  The archaeological evidence verifies that Wreck Baker was very heavily 
framed for its size.  
2.4 The Stage Is Set
It was on the inland waterways of North America that the United States and 
Royal Navies were well matched.  The main theaters of operation for these navies were 
the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain.  Both navies started the war with token forces on 
these waterways, forces that were rapidly expanded during the three sailing seasons 
encompassed by the hostilities.  The British, having a small local population in Canada 
from which to draw a militia, and with most of their army fighting Napoleon in Europe, 
16
were forced to consider the best means of defending a large territory from an enemy who 
could amass superior numbers at many points along the border.  To counteract this 
deficiency the British, especially early in the war, relied upon control of the lakes to 
allow them to quickly move troops and supplies to where they were most needed.25  As a 
result, Lake Ontario, as the key to the rest of the Great Lakes, became the site of a 
furious naval arms race.  
On August 16, 1812 General Isaac Brock, with a small force of 300 regulars and 
400 militia, accompanied by 600 Indian warriors, forced the surrender of Detroit.26  With 
the fall of Detroit and a lack of offensive action by the American forces under the 
command of Major-General Henry Dearborn, the importance of controlling the Great 
Lakes was becoming clear to the American leaders in Washington.  With this goal in 
mind, on September 3, 1812, the Secretary of the Navy ordered Captain Isaac Chauncey 
USN to take command of the naval forces on Lakes Ontario and Erie, and to make every 
effort towards controlling them by the fall.27  Chauncey, who now acquired the courtesy 
title 'commodore' because he commanded a squadron of ships, had previously served at 
sea and during the last four years as commander of the New York Navy Yard. 
In Commodore Chauncey the Americans had made an excellent choice for 
commander of the naval forces on the lakes.  With experience of both naval command, 
on  USS John Adams in 1804, and in shipbuilding, at New York, he was an ideal choice 
for this new command.28  Chauncey immediately undertook to send 170 sailors and 
marines, 140 ship carpenters, as well as more than 100 cannon and other supplies to 
17
Sackets Harbor.  The supplies and men traveled up the Hudson River to the Mohawk and 
from there up Wood Creek to the Oswego River, which empties into Lake Ontario; they 
then followed the shore line eastward to Sackets Harbor (figure 4).  Due to a lack of 
passable roads, this water route was used to transport most of the supplies received at 
Sackets Harbor during the war, but it was always open to British interference at its Lake 
Ontario terminus.29 
Figure 4. American supply route to Sackets Harbor. (drawing by Daniel 
Walker).
At the outset of the war, the American 16-gun brig Oneida was the most 
18
formidable ship on Lake Ontario but the overall force of the British Provincial Marine 
was greater than that of the Americans.  Thus, the opponents on the lake were about 
evenly matched, a situation that did not encourage offensive action.  The Provincial 
Marine was overseen by the Quartermaster General’s Department of the British Army 
lead by Sir George Prevost, Commander-in-Chief of the military and naval forces of 
British North America.
Prevost, born in 1767, entered the army in the 1780s, and in 1798 was appointed 
to the position of military governor of the island of St. Lucia in the West Indies.  Three 
years later in 1801 he assumed the role of civil governor before moving on to a position 
as Governor of the island of Dominica where he honed his skills dealing with the French 
population.  His success in this endeavor lead to his appointment to Canada in 1808.  In 
1811 he was appointed Governor General of the British colonies of Canada.
The stalemate on Lake Ontario, along with Prevost’s unwillingness to authorize 
aggression against the American forces, resulted in both sides undertaking to increase 
their forces to the point of attaining incontestable supremacy.  Both began to purchase or 
commandeer any suitable merchant vessels and outfit them for service with the 
squadrons.  Chauncey also sent Henry Eckford and 140 shipwrights to Sackets Harbor to 
establish a shipyard and fell timber to begin ship construction as quickly as possible. 
During the fall and winter of 1812-13, Chauncey’s squadron was increased with the 
launch of the 24-gun Madison (on November 26, 1812) and by the conversion of 
merchant schooners into gunboats.  The plan to arm schooners was a good short-term 
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solution but proved problematic as the refurbished vessels were not built to carry the 
armament placed upon them.  They proved to be poor sailers and, while they allowed 
Chauncey to put more guns on the lake, they had difficulty keeping station when sailing 
in formation.30  The numerically superior American forces could not be handled with the 
precision of the British ships and, as the sudden sinking of the schooners Hamilton and 
Scourge in 1813 would show, the converted schooners were so unstable as to be at the 
mercy of the weather.
The British forces had a daunting task supplying their Lake Ontario shipyards and 
were slower to act on this front, initially entrusting defense of the lake to the poorly 
manned and equipped Provincial Marine, a body designed to control cross-border trade 
rather than coordinate the wartime defense of Upper Canada.  They entered war with the 
United States equipped with four ships on Lake Ontario, the largest being the 20-gun 
Royal George that had been built in 1809 to counter the Unites States Navy’s Oneida. 
The Provincial Marine initially out-gunned the U.S. forces on the lake, but this would 
change quickly due to the strategy of non-aggression practiced by Prevost, Chauncey’s 
active building program, and the Provincial Marine's inability to match Chauncey’s 
industry.
Many of the vital shipbuilding supplies needed by the Royal Navy traveled across 
the Atlantic from England and then up the St. Lawrence River to Montreal where the 
Lachine Rapids made the river impassable to large boats.  In many places boatmen were 
forced to disembark and drag their cargo over the water using ropes.  Along the last part 
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of the route they were vulnerable to ambush by American forces.  Although the British 
were quick to realize the importance of controlling the Great Lakes, they failed to act 
early in the war to ensure continued dominance.  In his book The War of 1812 Henry 
Adams states that, “had he [Prevost] at once seized Sackets Harbor, as Brock seized 
Detroit, he would have been secure, for Sackets Harbor was the only spot from which the 
Americans could contest the control of Lake Ontario.”31  
Commodore Chauncey, on assuming command, quickly made the British pay for 
this oversight.  On Chauncey's orders his lieutenant Melancthon Woolsey traveled down 
to Oswego from Sackets Harbor and bought four merchant schooners that were outfitted 
to carry one or two 32-pounder long guns.  By November 8 the newly equipped ships 
along with Oneida (mounting sixteen 24-pounder carronades) were enough to drive the 
British off the lake and under the shelter of the battery at Kingston for what little 
remained of the navigation season.  The new Madison, a corvette armed with twenty-four 
32-pounder carronades, launched on November 26, made the British position even 
weaker.32  The naval build up on Lake Ontario, which would continue until the end of the 
war, had begun.
On November 27, 1812 Governor-General Prevost made it clear that the Royal 
Navy must take over the Provincial Marine if superiority on Lake Ontario were to be 
regained.33  The next spring the British government placed upon the Admiralty the 
responsibility for defending the inland waterways of Upper and Lower Canada.  On 
March 19, 1813 Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo was named as Commodore and given 
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Royal Navy officers and seamen to carry out his task.  Yeo had gone to sea at the age of 
10 and been promoted to Post Captain at 25.  He had taken part in many small ship 
actions and been knighted for his part in the capture of Cayenne in French Guiana.  Yeo 
sailed for Quebec in late March with the foundation of the forces needed to man the 
inland navy of North America.  His instructions from the Admiralty made clear the 
importance of coordination in these efforts with the regular army.34  With the arrival of 
Yeo and his forces in North America, Commodore Isaac Chauncey now had a more 
worthy adversary than the men of the Provincial Marine he had dealt with so handily in 
late 1812.  
2.5 The Sacking of York
With Chauncey’s control of Lake Ontario in late 1812 plans were made for the 
conquest of Upper Canada.  The United States Secretary of War John Armstrong, 
meeting in Albany with Commodore Chauncey and United States Army Major-General 
Henry Dearborn, outlined his plan for operations in 1813.  Armstrong correctly saw the 
taking of Kingston as the key to the conquest of Upper Canada.  He instructed Chauncey 
and Dearborn to take the heavily fortified Kingston and thereby deprive the British of 
both a naval base and further access to the lakes.35  Once Kingston fell, York and the 
Niagara Peninsula at the western end of Lake Ontario could be easily conquered.
Fortunately for the British both Chauncey and Dearborn soon began to doubt 
their ability to capture Kingston and instead wrote to Armstrong requesting the conquest 
of York be made the first objective of the 1813 campaign.36  This unwillingness to take 
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the all or nothing gamble would be an ongoing theme for both sides in their efforts to 
control Lake Ontario.
Chauncey and Dearborn reasoned that attacking York with its harbor and 
shipyard would weaken the British position on Lake Ontario, and they put forward a plan 
calling for the taking of York followed by an assault on the Niagara frontier.37  Once 
those objectives were completed the entire military force could be concentrated on 
Kingston.  Armstrong approved this new agenda and on April 27, 1813 the American 
forces undertook the attack on York.
The American force consisting of 1700 regulars in 15 vessels arrived off York 
during the afternoon of April 26.  The British Army's Sir Roger Sheaffe positioned some 
of his men at the suspected landing spot but the American small boats were carried past 
by the wind and instead landed to his west.  Sheaffe ordered an immediate bayonet 
charge in an attempt to prevent the landing but the Americans quickly overwhelmed the 
small force and a retreat was made toward the town.  With Chauncey’s shallow-drafted 
vessels keeping up a harassing fire of grape shot on the British, the Americans were able 
to take the British batteries (their attack was aided by the detonation of an open 
magazine that killed 20 British).  At this point Sheaffe realized that withdrawal of his 
regulars to Kingston was the best course of action and he therefore ordered his troops to 
set fire to an unfinished warship on the stocks and the naval storehouse, and ordered the 
‘Grand Magazine’ to be blown up.38  
The Americans, having chased off the British forces, took York and paroled the 
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remaining militia.  During the occupation, the parliament buildings were burnt down 
and, while this action was unauthorized, the military buildings and Government House 
were deliberately set ablaze.  These actions were used by the British to justify the 
burning of the Washington later in the war.  
While the American forces were successful in taking York, the rest of their 
expedition came to naught as the troops were in no state to make an attempt on Fort 
George after being trapped in Chauncey’s vessels during a gale.  The squadron therefore 
returned to Sackets Harbor, having accomplished little of strategic value.39  The British 
lost a shipyard and a ship nearing completion during the attack on York, but ultimately 
benefited from the loss as it brought home to them the folly of dividing their 
shipbuilding efforts between Kingston and the more poorly defended and harder to 
supply York.  Following the attack on York, British shipbuilding efforts on Lake Ontario 
were concentrated at Kingston.  
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3 THE FRIGATE PRINCESS CHARLOTTE
3.1 The Shipbuilders Arrive
Upon his arrival at Kingston in May of 1813, Sir James Lucas Yeo, along with 
Captain Robert H. Barclay and several other newly arrived captains and officers, set out 
to greatly increase the readiness of the naval force at Kingston.  Chauncey at this time 
was stationed off the mouth of the Niagara River helping the American army in its 
assault on Fort George.  Prevost, learning that Chauncey and his squadron were at the 
other end of the lake, and realizing that with the launching of another, soon to be 
completed, corvette Chauncey would be able to drive the British off the lake, decided to 
make a strike at Sackets Harbor.  The reasons for this strike were twofold; it would 
create a diversion, drawing Chauncey’s attention away from the Niagara frontier; and it 
would destroy the dockyard and the corvette under construction.40  
On May 27, 1813,  most of the troops from the garrison at Kingston were loaded 
onto the available ships, schooners, gunboats, and bateaux and transported across the 
lake to Sackets Harbor.  The arrival at Sackets Harbor was complicated by adverse winds 
that kept the troops from making an immediate landing, trapping them in the transports 
until the next morning.  This delay greatly diminished the chances of success by 
decreasing the morale and fighting spirit of the British troops and negating the element 
of surprise.41
The delay allowed the American militia from the surrounding areas to reinforce 
the small garrison at Sackets Harbor and when the attack came it was initially a hard 
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fight with neither side gaining a clear advantage.  When the British had gained the 
advantage Prevost apparently spotted the dust cloud created by the retreating defenders 
and mistook it for reinforcements.  As a result of this mistake he ordered a return to the 
boats and abandoned the attack.42
Despite Prevost’s loss of confidence the British almost succeeded in achieving 
one of their most important goals.  John Drury, an American lieutenant left in charge of 
the naval yard, upon hearing an erroneous report that the British attack had been a 
success, set the naval yard, barracks, and the new ship on the stocks ablaze.43 
Fortunately for Chauncey the fire was put out before substantial harm was done to his 
new corvette.  The British troops returned to Kingston having accomplished little of 
consequence against the American forces and shipbuilding program at Sackets Harbor.
On June 4, Chauncey returned to Sackets Harbor and Yeo moved up the lake 
with 220 regulars to help Brigadier-General John Vincent in his efforts against Major-
General Dearborn.  Yeo made further contributions to the British army at the west end of 
Lake Ontario by harassing the American supply route.  During the month of June, Yeo 
captured several watercraft loaded with supplies for Fort Niagara and burned a 
storehouse after removing 600 barrels of provisions.
During this period Chauncey kept his squadron at Sackets Harbor while waiting 
for his new ship to be launched and outfitted.44  This strategy by Chauncey set the tone 
for the naval war on Lake Ontario: each side resolutely avoided action until it achieved 
temporary superiority over the foe.  Thus, the American naval force remained in port at 
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Sackets Harbor awaiting the launch of the new vessel while Yeo tried to goad Chauncey 
into battle.  Once the new corvette General Pike (launched June 12, 1813) had been 
outfitted, Chauncey was finally able to leave port.  On June 21, he embarked with his 
squadron to assist the armies at the western end of the lake.  He had planned to attack 
Vincent’s supply depot near Burlington but was forced to abandon the idea upon 
discovering that it was heavily defended.  Instead, Chauncey re-occupied York where the 
American troops took provisions and burned storehouses.45  Chauncey then left for the 
Niagara River where, on August 7, he encountered Yeo.  It seemed inevitable at this 
point that Yeo, with his squadron of two ships, two schooners and two brigs, would enter 
into a decisive battle for control of the lake with Chauncey’s ships.  After a day of 
maneuvering for advantage, two of Chauncey’s schooners, Hamilton and Scourge, were 
swamped and sunk during a sudden night time squall.  With 70 sailors drowned, this 
disaster was to be the largest loss of life on Lake Ontario during the entire course of the 
war.46 
During the next few days Yeo refused to close with the Americans choosing 
instead to try and separate the American schooners from the rest of the force.  He 
succeeded in this goal on August 11 by capturing two of the United States Navy's 
schooners but Chauncey still retained the balance of power and Yeo eventually returned 
to Kingston.47
Less than one month later, Commodore Yeo was forced to leave the safety of 
Kingston to convoy supplies to the head of Lake Ontario.  During this trip, near the 
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mouth of the Niagara River, on September 7, 1813, Chauncey almost forced an 
engagement.  Yeo recognized his peril and, not wanting to engage the stronger American 
squadron, fled back to the safety of Kingston with Chauncey in pursuit.  The two 
squadrons remained in close proximity for the next five days as they traveled most of the 
length of the lake.  Yeo was successful in avoiding a full naval battle and eventually 
found shelter in a bay five miles (8 km) west of Kingston.  The British lost 4 killed and 7 
wounded in the running fight during which a lack of long guns put Yeo's ships at a 
disadvantage.48
On September 28, in another running battle, Chauncey’s squadron chased the 
British into Burlington Bay with a British loss of 5 killed and 13 wounded.  Yeo’s 
squadron was not totally impotent, however, for in this encounter they seem to have 
gotten the best of the Americans as Chauncey reported 27 killed and wounded along with 
the loss of the top gallant mast on General Pike.49  Many of the American casualties were 
caused when a 24-pounder on Pike's forecastle exploded.50  The 'Burlington Races', as 
this battle came to be known, was the last major encounter between the two squadrons 
for the duration of the navigation season.  During the course of the winter both 
commodores turned their attention to ship building in an attempt to gain permanent 
control over Lake Ontario.
Henry Eckford had kept busy at Sackets Harbor, launching the schooner Lady of 
the Lake, the ship General Pike, and the schooner Sylph during the 1813 sailing season. 
Despite opportunities to engage in a decisive battle during the summer of 1813 little of 
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significance transpired with the exception of the sinking of Hamilton and Scourge and 
the capturing of small schooners and transports.  Eckford did not let up his blistering 
pace of construction, and the opening of the 1814 season saw the 20-gun brigs Jefferson 
and Jones launched April 7 and April 13, 1814, respectively.  The Americans were not 
finished though and launched the frigate Superior May 1, 1814, and then Mohawk, 
another frigate, on June 11.51  Mohawk was the last ship launched by Chauncey but at the 
end of the war Eckford had New Orleans, a ship of the line, nearly completed on the 
stocks, and New York shipwrights Adam and Noah Brown had arrived to assist in the 
opening of another shipyard at nearby Storr’s Harbor where the ship of the line 
Chippewa was under construction.52
The British were not idle during this period either.  A young lieutenant named 
John Le Couteur with the British 104th Foot Regiment in Kingston astutely observed that, 
“it was a war of Carpenters as to getting the command of the lake – the Yankees being 
building at Sackets Harbor with that view also.”53  The British began the war with the 
ships of the Provincial Marine including the Royal George, Earl of Moira, Prince 
Regent (schooner), and the Duke of Gloucester (captured by Chauncey in the attack on 
York).  Over the first winter of the war the ship  Sir George Prevost (later Wolfe) was 
built and launched on April 28, 1813.54  This was the largest ship in the British Squadron 
when built and served as James Lucas Yeo’s first flagship on Lake Ontario.  A smaller 
brig, Lord Melville (later Star), was launched in July and was the last vessel launched by 
the Royal Navy on the lake in 1813.55  The shipyard’s next projects would dramatically 
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increase the pace of the arms race on Lake Ontario.  The fall and winter preceding 
navigation in 1814 was a period of furious activity at the Lake Ontario shipyard.  The 
British considered construction of a brig or a transport but before the keel was laid the 
vessel was enlarged to be the frigate Princess Charlotte.56  A second frigate was begun 
soon thereafter.  On April 14, 1814 Princess Charlotte was sent down the slipway at the 
Kingston Navy Yard, joined later in the day by the bigger Prince Regent.  The launching 
of these two frigates gave the Royal Navy uncontested control of the lake early in the 
1814 sailing season. 
3.2 The Builder
The launching of Princess Charlotte completed George Record’s service as a 
builder in the Kingston Yard.  The first evidence of George Record in British North 
America appears in an advertisement placed in the Quebec Gazette on November 29, 
1810 asking for information on a portable mahogany writing desk that had been stolen 
from a house in Lower Town Quebec.  Interestingly, the desk was reported to contain a 
red Morocco pocket book that indicated its owner had previously lived in Appledon, 
Devon, in England, a location that made sense for someone with experience in 
shipbuilding.57  Appledon, also called Appleton and Appledore, is a port town in North 
Devon were a younger George Record could have begun to learn his craft. 
On July 11, 1811 the Quebec Gazette announced the appointment of George 
Record to the post of Master Culler and Measurer of Timber, masts, spars and planks for 
the Port of Quebec.58  This position indicates that by 1811 Record had a good 
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understanding of ships and shipbuilding, and was responsible for selecting the timbers 
needed for the various shipbuilding projects undertaken by the government at the Port of 
Quebec.  Experience in this position would have given him many of the skills necessary 
to undertake his later work as the Assistant to the Master Builder, and later Master 
Builder, at the Royal Navy Dockyard in Kingston.
With the outbreak of the War of 1812, George Record began to petition for a 
posting with the naval forces in Upper Canada.  His letter to Sir George Prevost, dated 
14 January, 1813, stated that he had made an application on November 24, 1812 for such 
an opportunity and had been provided with letters for the Commissary and Quarter 
Masters at Montreal.  Record had then traveled to Montreal to deliver his letters to these 
men and receive his posting only to discover that neither was in the city at that moment. 
As he wrote in his letter on January 14 neither man had yet returned and he petitioned Sir 
George Prevost to decide his fate.59
Sir George Prevost, through Noah Freer, quickly responded to Record's request 
and on January 16, 1813 promised to provide a letter recommending him to Major 
General Roger Sheaffe who, as commander of the forces in Upper Canada, controlled the 
Provincial Marine.  This letter asked that Record's request to be given a position as an 
officer in one of the ships or in one of the shipyards be granted.  The letter also spoke to 
Record's apparent skills, as mention was made of Colonel Edward Baynes approval of 
George Record as useful to the public service.60  The letter to Sheaffe was written the 
same day. 
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The bearer hereof, Mr. Geo: Record, having made an offer of his services to the 
Comm.  of the Forces, I am directed to furnish him with this letter to you, and to 
signify his Excellency’s Desire that this Gentleman may be employed in the 
District of Upper Canada under your Command, as an officer on board of one of 
the Armed vessels on the Lakes or in such a situation, in one of the shipyards, as 
his abilities upon Exam & Trial may entitle him to.61
On February 14, George Record was appointed the assistant to Daniel Allen the Master 
Builder at the shipyard in Kingston.62  Here he was immediately put to work building Sir 
George Prevost, a 22-gun ship designed by Thomas Plunckett, as well as designing and 
building another smaller schooner.
Within a month of his arrival at Kingston the wheels were already being set in 
motion for George Record to receive more responsibility.  On  March 11, 1813 the 
artificers complained about promised provisions not having been provided to them and 
nearly everyone refused to work.  An officer and 40 troops were mobilized from the 
nearby garrison and surrounded the artificers, after which most of them returned to their 
duties.  Master Shipbuilder Allen was called upon to point out the ringleaders but 
refused.  Captain J.B. Irwin believed Allen to be sympathetic with the mutinous behavior 
of his artificers and, beyond that, Irwin believed Allen was damned by his American 
birth.  Irwin therefore suggested that Allen be removed from his position and from 
Kingston as well.  Irwin also highly recommended George Record to take Allen's place.
I have therefore to suggest Sir that Mr. Allen be removed from the yard & his 
place filled by the Assistant Builder, Mr. Record than whom I know not a more 
capable man, both in the theory and practice in his profession.63
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By March 18 this report had reached Prevost, who concurred and officially appointed 
George Record to the post of Master Builder at the Kingston shipyard. 64  On April 25, 
1813 Sir George Prevost, measuring 101 feet 9 inches (31.01 meters) by 30 feet 6 inches 
(9.30 meters), was launched.  Once outfitted and manned, this ship, renamed Wolfe and 
the last ship to be launch by the Provincial Marine, forced Chauncey into the protective 
confines Sackets Harbor to await the launch of his new ships.  Within days of Wolfe’s 
launch, Royal Navy Commander Robert Barclay arrived at Kingston and responsibility 
for the naval forces on the Great Lakes was assumed by the Royal Navy under the overall 
command of Captain James Lucas Yeo.
George Record had little time to rest, as he was also building a schooner laid 
down in March.  Much smaller than Wolfe, this vessel was redesigned prior to the arrival 
of the Royal Navy as a brig, allowing it to carry heavier guns.  Launched as Lord 
Melville in July 1813, the brig measured 71 feet 7 inches (21.82 meters) on deck with a 
breadth of 24 feet  8 inches (7.52m), and was pierced for 14 guns.
Master Builder George Record was not to get a break as the building war 
between the shipyards at Kingston and Sackets Harbor began to gain momentum. 
Reports of additional ship construction being undertaken by Commodore Chauncey 
spurred Sir James Lucas Yeo to order another ship built at Kingston.  On July 23, 1813 
Yeo proposed that the Kingston shipyard lay down a large ship with a gun deck 160 feet 
(48.77 meters) long and moulded beam of 42 feet (12.80 meters) that would become 
Prince Regent.  While this proposal seemed to meet with approval nothing occurred until 
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the fall.  In July George Record launched the brig Lord Melville, the first ship he is given 
credit for both designing and building.  He was then put to work building gunboats until 
we hear of him again on September 18, 1813, this time appealing to leave the service as 
he claimed of being ill-treated by the officers in charge of the dockyard who he felt were 
interfering with his ability to do his job.65  This problem, however, seems to have been 
only temporary as he was still in his position as Master Ship Builder when work began 
on Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte.
On September 21, 1813, only three days after requesting permission to be 
relieved of his position, George Record sent a letter to Noah Freer requesting artificers to 
build a transport requested by Yeo.  Record also used the letter to recommend that a brig 
be built instead, as he reasoned that the brig could be used as either a transport or a ship-
of-war, and be quickly brought to completion once its final role was determined.66  On 
October 8, 1813 a letter from Sir James Lucas Yeo to Sir George Prevost further 
increased the scope of this project by recommending that he approve a request to build a 
ship-of-war. The letter stated that Record had informed him that Royal George was in a 
weak and defective state and that the cost to build a larger ship in place of the brig was 
negligible, especially when compared with the cost to repair Royal George.67  Yeo 
further reinforced the idea of constructing another warship when he wrote on October 8, 
1813;
The enemy I have no doubt (if they do not succeed in their designs on Upper 
Canada this year) will build another ship capable of carrying heavy metal, if they 
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do, I have only to assure your excellency that had I any number of Brigs that they 
would not be of the smallest service against ships mounting such Metal.  I 
therefore much wish your excellency would order her to be built by the following 
dimensions 
Length 110 feet,  Breadth Moulded 36 feet,  Depth of Hold 10 feet68
George Record's request was approved in a letter from Commander Richard O’Conor, 
the commissioner at the Kingston naval yard, on October 14, 1813.69  A letter dated the 
next day confirmed that the brig Record was to build was now to be laid down as a ship 
with the dimensions mentioned in James Lucas Yeo's letter of  October 8.  The October 
14  letter also describes discord within the shipyard.  The artificers working under 
contract for John Goudie building New Ship 1, Prince Regent, were getting paid 
considerably more than those under Mr. Record and, therefore, the artificers working on 
New Ship 2, Princess Charlotte were unhappy and threatening labor unrest.  This 
problem arose because, while both John Goudie’s and George Record’s men worked 
under government contracts, Goudie’s men were apparently getting higher pay and doing 
less work than Record’s.  To correct this disparity the government suggested that the 
wages of Goudie’s men be reduced.70
By October 22, 1813, Sir James Lucas Yeo wrote that in his opinion the discord 
within the shipyard was so bad that it was having an affect on the completion of the ships 
under construction at Kingston.  He went on to recommend that either both ships be 
completed by one builder or that Goudie be persuaded to enter into a contract for 
completing his ship under which he would be responsible for paying his artificers out of 
the proceeds allotted by the contract.  It was believed that this would both ease the 
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tension amongst the artificers and make it financially advantageous for Goudie to 
expedite the completion of the contract.71  
By the end of October the artificers at Kingston, aware of the importance of their 
work and the disparity between their wages and those earned by the artificers on Lake 
Champlain, once again expressed a reluctance to perform their duties.  In an effort to 
bring some stability to the shipyard the government entered into a private contract with 
George Record for the construction of New Ship 2.  In order to ensure timely delivery a 
1000 pound penalty was stipulated if the ship was not completed by May 1, 1814.72  
In late November 1813 work on the two frigates was proceeding quickly and 
news arrived that construction supplies were ready to be brought up to Kingston on a 
fleet of bateaux.73  This progress continued through December when the frigates were far 
enough along for it to be stated that:
...it affords me infinite pleasure to have the honor of transmitting for your 
excellency’s information the accompanying report of the forward state of the 
ships building and to acquaint you the Prince Regent promises to be as fine and 
formidable a Frigate as any sailing on the Atlantic, The Princess 
Charlotte (late Vittoria) has likewise every appearance of being a most desirable 
vessel in size equal to our small Frigates but in force superior from the heavy 
metal she is intended to carry.74
Work continued on the frigates throughout the winter but their dominance of the lake 
appeared to be in jeopardy as news arrived that Commodore Chauncey was constructing 
four new vessels at Sackets Harbor.75  
The information on the building program at Sackets Harbor arrived via an 
American seaman deserter who reported the armament of the ships being built at 
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Sackets Harbor. His intelligence prompted O'Conor to write “... the requisition for 24 
pdrs from Halifax had better be altered to 32 pd long – if this be true.”76   The deposition 
of Robert Christie, who had deserted March 23, 1814 from his position as a carpenter at 
Sackets Harbor gave a thorough report of the progress being made there;
...there are two brigs building at Sackets; he expects they are calculated to carry 
24 guns each, they are planked up to the bends, but not caulked, and no part of 
the deck lain, the large ship building on the point he calculated to carry 48 guns, 
says she is planked up to her bends the same as the brigs, not caulked and no part 
of the deck lain.  He heard Commodore Chauncey say the other night (last 
Saturday) to Captain Crane they must give the large ship up, as they have not 
sufficient water to launch her, they had tried making sufficient holes in the ice, 
and could only find about eleven feet water.77 
With this level of intelligence moving back and forth between the shipyards it is seems 
that both sides were closely adapting their building programs to outclass the enemy.  
On April 14, 1814 Lieutenant John Le Couteur of the 104th Foot described the 
launch of the frigate Princess Charlotte.
...at ½  past 5, the blocks were knocked away and the pretty Frigate Princess 
Charlotte glided into the smooth fresh water, dashing the white foam before her 
in her plunge.  The gallant Mulcaster, her Captain, was launched with her.  Half 
an hour later, the Regent, a Noble Sixty-gun Frigate, followed the Princess, as a 
lover to guard his Belle.78  
After the frigates were launched they were quickly outfitted for service on the lake and, 
upon entering active duty, gave the Royal Navy the superiority necessary to keep 
Chauncey's squadron contained in Sackets Harbor.  With the launch of Princess 
Charlotte, George Record concluded his service at Kingston having delivered the frigate 
on time and without penalty.  A report sent to Prevost from Kingston on May 5, 1814 
observed that the two frigates, “appear to sail remarkably well.”79  
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The ships built and launched from Kingston during the final sailing season of the 
war were of unique construction designed, built and armed in a remote location to 
combat a single enemy.  These ships, built to sail on fresh water, had the added 
advantage of not needing to stow potable water in their holds.   This allowed the ships to 
be heavily armed, incorporate a high degree of deadrise and at the same time be 
relatively shallow drafted.  This idea of customizing construction to take into account the 
enemy and the local condition was brought to the fore in a letter arguing against sending 
fir frigates built in Britian to Upper Canada that stated “...the third ship which is intended 
and understood to be constructing of that Force, as equivalent and better adapted to the 
great object of obtaining the decided superiority over our enemy on Lake Ontario”80
It is not surprising, therefore, that the construction techniques noted 
archaeologically are unique.  The lack of sufficient compass timber forced the builders to 
fashion the necessary curves from old growth, straight grained timbers fastened together 
with bolts and metal plates.  The large timbers and tight framing can be attributed to the 
need for these ships to meet ships built in the heavy American style exhibited by the 
frigates fighting on the Atlantic and Jefferson, Jones, Superior, and Mohawk  built at 
Sackets Harbor during the same period.
3.3 The Career of Princess Charlotte
By May 1, 1814 Princess Charlotte and Prince Regent, pierced for 42 and 56 
guns respectively, had been ballasted, rigged, provisioned, and armed.81  Sir James Lucas 
Yeo took Prince Regent captained by Richard O'Conor as his flagship and gave 
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command of Princess Charlotte to Captain William Howe Mulcaster.  Mulcaster, a 
friend of Yeo's who had followed the Commodore to Canada, had distinguished himself 
in 1806 during a cutting out expedition in Spain and gained a reputation for courage and 
intelligence.82  Le Couteur refers to him as the “the gallant Mulcaster,”83 suggesting these 
attributes had also been noted by the men serving with him in North America.
Not wanting to forfeit their advantage, Commodore Yeo and Lieutenant General 
Gordon Drummond presented to Governor-General Prevost a plan to attack Sackets 
Harbor in order to secure Upper Canada and destroy the frigate being built there.  In a 
letter to Prevost, Drummond stated, “should an opportunity offer, by even a temporary 
naval superiority, for the destruction of the Enemy's fleet, and Arsenal at Sackets 
Harbour, a vigorous combined attack by the Navy would be highly advisable.”84   Prevost 
was unwilling to approve this plan as it required troops be moved to Kingston from 
Lower Canada. 
 Yeo and Drummond, loath to sit idle while in control of the lake, decided to 
proceed with an attack on the less heavily fortified Oswego harbor, a key link in the 
American supply route.85  On May 4, 1814 the British squadron, including the ships 
Wolfe and Royal George, the brigs Earl of Moira and Lord Melville, the schooners Sir 
Sidney Smith and Lord Beresford, and the the newly outfitted  frigates Prince Regent and 
Princess Charlotte, were loaded with troops and set course for Oswego.86  Hampered by 
a southwest wind, the squadron anchored for the evening before resuming the journey to 
Oswego at 2 am.  On May 5 the squadron stood off Oswego but the attack was hampered 
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by strong breezes that forced the squadron to head offshore.  The next morning, with 
only a light breeze, the squadron again stood in for Oswego.  They began the attack with 
Wolfe and Royal George firing on the batteries while the gunboats fired on the town. 
Princess Charlotte also took part firing on the fort with its main deck guns.  Following 
this, the troops, including Captain Mulcaster, successfully landed under the cover of 
Lord Melville and Earl of Moira.  By 2:45 pm the marines and seamen had taken the fort 
and hoisted the British flag.  During the evening the British troops and the spoils of the 
raid were loaded onto the ships to return to Kingston.87
In his report to George Prevost, General Drummond stated that they had 
captured: “seven heavy guns, that were intended for the enemy's new ship, three 32 
pounders that were sunk by the enemy in the river as well as a large quantity of cordage 
and other naval stores; the loss to them therefore has been very great....”88  Two 
American schooners, Growler and Penelope, had been scuttled, but were refloated and 
delivered back to Kingston. While arguably a successful engagement the ninety 
casualties incurred at Oswego did much to dissuade Yeo from making an attack on 
Sackets Harbor.89  Princess Charlotte's Captain Mulcaster was one of those wounded 
during the battle receiving a musket ball in the upper thigh.  This wound was too high up 
the leg to allow for amputation but he would survive the injury.
Making the most of his advantage Yeo, after unloading the supplies captured at 
Oswego, set sail on May 11 to search the southern shore of the lake for enemy goods in 
transit.  He took up a position between Sackets Harbor and Oswego with Prince Regent, 
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Princess Charlotte, Wolfe, and Royal George, while the smaller vessels in his squadron 
searched for the enemy and ferried troops and supplies around the lake.90
On May 29 the British captured a boat loaded with supplies heading to Sackets 
Harbor.  The crew reported that they were part of a large flotilla that had gotten lost. 
Yeo, sensing an opportunity to materially damage the enemy and delay the outfitting of 
their new ships, sent Captain Stephen Popham and 160 men in two gunboats and three 
cutters to capture the flotilla.  The leader of the flotilla, Melancthon Woolsey, fearing the 
British would capture his missing boat fled up Sandy Creek and sent a messenger to 
Chauncey requesting assistance.  Early the next morning just after receiving word that 
Chauncey was sending help, Woolsey ordered a scout to the lake to determine whether 
the British were in fact looking for the American boats.  The scout returned with news 
that the British were on their way and Woolsey decided to set an ambush using the men 
from the American flotilla reinforced by Oneida Indians and troops from Sackets Harbor. 
Despite a careful advance by the British the Americans successfully sprang their trap the 
next morning, surrounded Popham's party and forced it to surrender.91  This left the 
entire squadron short of men and Yeo was forced to move crews out of his schooners, 
reducing them to transports.  On June 5 Yeo abandoned his station off Sackets Harbor 
and returned to Kingston where, except for a round trip with reinforcement and supplies 
to Niagara at the end of June, he remained until the launch of his next ship.92
Isaac Chauncey and his shipwright Henry Eckford were busy at Sackets Harbor 
and it was necessary for the British to launch two additional ships in 1814 in order to 
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keep up with the American building program.  Anyone in Kingston during the summer 
of 1814 who took a trip out to the naval yard would have seen a sight unprecedented on 
the Great Lakes: a ship-of-the-line on the stocks.  This ship, named St. Lawrence, was 
launched September 10, 1814 and was followed on Christmas Day by Psyche, a frigate 
built in England and sent over in frame.  Psyche was the last ship launched by the British 
during the war although, when news of the Treaty of Ghent reached Upper Canada, two 
more ships-of-the-line, Wolfe and Canada, were being built at Kingston, indicating that 
the naval arms race was still escalating rapidly.  One has to wonder at what point the 
building programs on Lake Ontario would have outstripped the ability to outfit and man 
the ships that were being constructed. 
In the months after the war the unfinished Royal Navy ships on the stocks were 
housed over and the rest of the ships in the establishment were assessed and had their 
lines taken off by Thomas Strickland.93  The Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 
demilitarized the Great Lakes, putting an end to the need for ships the size of the three 
British frigates and the ship-of-the-line.  These once proud ships were docked in Navy 
Bay, housed over and place in ordinary.  Eventually they were decommissioned and sold. 
St. Lawrence was scuttled and used as a wharf.  Prince Regent and another ship were 
moored at the head of Navy Bay where they became a navigation hazard prompting their 
removal sometime in the 1840's to nearby Deadman Bay.  It was here they eventually 
sank out of sight and were largely forgotten.94  
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3.4 Logistical Support
As the intensity of the 'Builder’s War' on Lake Ontario escalated, the wilderness 
shipyard demands for the necessities of shipbuilding (including iron nails, spikes, 
cannon, carronades, ballast, and other items) increased dramatically.  Most of the 
materials needed for shipbuilding were not readily available at Kingston or Sackets 
Harbor.  For the British shipbuilders stores that could previously have been purchased 
from the United States now had to be shipped to Kingston from Halifax, Quebec, 
Montreal and, in many cases, from as far away as Great Britain. 95  The difficulties 
associated with obtaining goods affected how, where, and when ships were built on Lake 
Ontario.
Early in the war the Provincial Marine divided shipbuilding operations between 
Kingston and York.  Goods destined for York were transported to Kingston and then 
loaded onto ships and sailed to York, putting them at risk of being captured by the 
American naval forces. This danger, along with the American sacking of York in early 
1813, lead to the consolidation of shipbuilding operations at Kingston.
Building and outfitting the frigates Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte during 
the fall and winter of 1813-14 greatly increased the quantity of supplies needed at 
Kingston.  Goods traveled by ship as far as Montreal where, due to the Lachine Rapids, 
they were transferred to flotillas of bateaux, or carried overland, for the 180 mile (288 
km) journey to Kingston.  A letter from Commander Richard O’Conor, commissioner of 
the dockyard, illustrates how vital the continuous supply of materials was to the 
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shipbuilding effort; on October 24, 1813 he wrote, “our progress with both vessels being 
so rapid as to lead me to apprehend a check for want of supplies from below particularly 
in the article of spike nails of dia. .7, .8, & .9 inch…”96  In May 1814, shortly after the 
launching of Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte, Yeo reemphasized the difficult 
nature of the task when he wrote to the Admiralty, “it would be endless to detail the 
substitutes used and the difficulties to be overcome in constructing vessels of force in a 
country so new and deficient of materials.”97  His comments illustrate the important role 
logistical concerns played in the construction of the ships at Kingston.98 
One of the main sources of construction materials for Yeo’s ships were old Royal 
Navy vessels.  These ships were sailed from Britain to Lower Canada as troop transports 
and, upon arrival, laid up and stripped of their hardware, ballast, and armament.  Much 
of the material to furnish and arm Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte was supplied by 
the sloops Aeolus and Indian in Quebec. 99  The material taken from these ships and 
transported to Kingston included 100 tons of iron pigs necessary for ballast on Prince 
Regent,100 23,000 yards of canvas for Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte,101  as well as 
much of the armament. Even when the necessary supplies were obtained they could go 
missing en route.  For example, in Gordon Drummond's letter to George Prevost, sent 
from Kingston on April 26, 1814, he asks that the person responsible for the transport of 
ringbolts required for the guns of Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte be sent back 
along the route, accompanied by an intelligent officer, to locate these supplies vital to the 
outfitting of the frigates.102
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Both commodores engaged in the contest on Lake Ontario realized the 
importance of logistical support for their success and for the success of their opponent's 
shipbuilding efforts.  Each side's  supply lines were vulnerable to attack and disruption 
by enemy forces, and any equipment seized would strengthen the aggressor to the same 
degree that it weakened his opponent.  American shipbuilding supplies reached 
Chauncey from New York by first traveling north up the Hudson River to the Mohawk 
River where they traveled west as far as Rome and then either down a small canal or 
overland to Lake Oneida and down the Oswego River to Oswego on Lake Ontario and 
from there north to Sackets Harbor (figure 4).  Low water levels and muddy ground 
could conspire to make this an arduous journey.  Indeed, during the spring of 1814 warm 
conditions lead a group of teamsters to abandon Chauncey’s ordnance after it sank into a 
muddy road alongside the Hudson River.103  Having the shipbuilding operations on Lake 
Ontario at Sackets Harbor meant that once supplies reached Lake Ontario at Oswego, 
they had to be transported from there north to the shipyard, leaving them open to 
predation by the British forces.  As the ship building war escalated, both sides attempted 
to prey on the opposition's supply routes. Despite its difficulties, Chauncey’s shorter 
supply line allowed him to move equipment relatively quickly and to wait until the 
armaments of the British ships were known and then arm his own vessels accordingly. 
Commodore Sir Edward W.C. Owen, who after the war studied both shipyards, noted 
that “the ‘Regent’ mounting twenty-four pounders was to be opposed by the ‘Superior’ 
with thirty-two pounders, and mounted with four more guns on the main deck.”104  This 
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proximity to New York allowed Chauncey to limit any advantage Yeo might gain by 
escalating the size of ships.
The transport of increasingly heavy armament to Kingston became an issue for 
Yeo.  Heavy loads could be transported in two ways: up the St. Lawrence on shallow- 
bottomed vessels such as bateaux that could navigate between Montreal and Kingston or 
overland by wagon and sled (figure 3).  The problem with transporting supplies up the 
St. Lawrence was twofold; first, there were rapids along this route that could endanger 
the cargo, and, secondly, there was the danger of the shipment being captured by an 
enemy force striking from the American side of the river.  Overland transport was 
preferred, though many of the necessary supplies could only easily be transported during 
the winter when the surfaces of the roads between Montreal and Kingston had frozen, 
creating a solid surface capable of supporting the weight of the shipment.  The following 
letter illustrates the problems associated with both supply and transportation of heavy 
items such as guns.
Arrangements have been made for the Transport of a considerable proportion of 
the supplies you require....  Twenty 24 pdrs & twelve 18 pdrs (with ship
carriages) and 6 12 pdrs with their stores and apportenances except ships 
carriages are at Montreal awaiting for the New Winter Road being established.  
At three Rivers there are Eighteen 24 pdrs with 12 ship carriages and I have 
ordered from Quebec Six 68pdr carronades and twenty 24 pdr guns. – As it is 
possible that last mentioned guns may not get to Kingston in time you may only 
be receiving in the course of the months of Feb. and March  -- 38 24 pdrs 10 18 
pdrs and 6 68 pdr carronades.105  
The difficulty in obtaining the necessary materials combined with the need to 
quickly build and launch the frigates in order to overtake the American building program 
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led to numerous shortcuts being taken in the construction of the ships.106  While Princess 
Charlotte was very heavily framed, a survey done following the war reported numerous 
problems with the construction.  Thomas Strickland considered Princess Charlotte to be 
“Perfectly sound, but being put together very bad and not sufficient fastening occasions 
weakness.”107  He also noted a lack of sufficient knees and carlings, a shortfall that is 
evident in the archaeological record.  A later report noted widespread dry rot and decay 
brought on by the use of unseasoned timber during construction.108
The shortage of adequate shipbuilding materials is evident in the archaeological 
data.  There is a lack of fasteners associated with the chocks beneath the keelson and 
those between the first and third futtocks.  There is also no evidence of either hanging 
knees or a deck clamp in the construction of the orlop deck.  At the level of the orlop 
deck there is only one row of bolts protruding from the frames and evidence found 
towards the stern suggests that these bolts were for lodging knees and not a deck clamp.
Given the already overtaxed state of the supply route it is little wonder that Royal 
Navy personnel in Upper Canada were vehemently against a plan to send four ships in 
frame from England to Kingston.  Early in the war the Admiralty had decided to go 
forward with a plan to build four vessels complete, except for planks and decks, and then 
disassemble and ship them to Montreal and then on to Kingston.  By the time these four 
fir-built ships, including the two frigates Prompte and Psyche and two brigs, were ready 
for shipment, the ability of the British to move supplies from Montreal to Kingston were 
being strained by the building and outfitting St. Lawrence.  Yeo opposed the plan, as the 
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strain it put on the supply route would put the completion of the ships already being built 
at Kingston in jeopardy.109  He wrote that the only possible way to move the pre-
fabricated ships from Montreal to Kingston without derailing the current projects was to 
pay a private contractor and he was loath to do this as he feared the American forces 
might get wind of the situation and move to capture or destroy the ships in transit.110 
Despite these objections the ships were built and sent across the Atlantic, although, by 
the time they arrived in North America it had been decided that only one of them was to 
be shipped on to Kingston.  Contractor William Forbes was hired to transport Psyche to 
Kingston, a job he accomplished without incident.111  This private contract allowed the 
Royal Navy to concentrate on transporting the supplies necessary to outfit the 104-gun 
St. Lawrence under construction at the Kingston Naval Yard.
Indeed, obtaining the necessary armament for his increasingly large ships proved 
to be a constant battle for Commodore Yeo.  The frigates Prince Regent, Princess 
Charlotte, and the 104-gun St. Lawrence were to be heavily armed for their size, but it 
was difficult to obtain the necessary cannon.  During the spring of 1814, with the launch 
of Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte imminent, reports of the ordnance bound for 
Sackets Harbor led Richard O'Conor to remark, “Where in the name of heaven are all 
these long guns to come from?”112  As these larger ships were introduced, the guns for 
Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte were removed from Aeolus and Indian in 
Montreal and the guns and other fittings for St. Lawrence were removed from the 74-gun 
ships Ajax, Centaur, and Warspite at Quebec.113  
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The locations of both the American and British shipyards on Lake Ontario, and 
the strain of transporting shipbuilding materials for increasingly large vessels being built 
with increasing frequency, affected both the construction and armament of the ships 
assembled on Lake Ontario during the War of 1812.  There was an adequate supply of 
long, straight timbers in the old growth forests around Kingston, but tall, straight trees 
did not yield good compass timber, which had to be hauled to Kingston from up to 20 
miles (36km) away.114  This paucity of proper timber can be seen in the scantlings 
recorded during the research undertaken by Jonathan Moore in 1999 during research for 
a draft entitled “Frontier Frigates and a Three Decker: Wrecks of the Royal Navy's Lake 
Ontario Squadron” on wrecks Able and Baker in Deadman Bay and that of St.  
Lawrence.  The construction of Prince Regent (figure 5) and St. Lawrence (figure 6) 
made little use of compass timber and employ unique methods to create the necessary 
shapes from thick straight timbers.  This creative use of timber is also evident in the 
construction of Wreck Baker. 
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Figure 5. Plan of the Prince Regent remains based on the photo project. (drawing 
by C. Pillar).
Figure 6. Plan of the St. Lawrence based on the photo project. (drawing by C. 
Pillar).
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4 ARCHAEOLOGY
4.1 Earlier Work on the Deadman Bay Wrecks115
Forgotten beneath the waves, the two wrecks in Deadman Bay became the 
casualties of time.  The first archaeological work on the wrecks was undertaken in 1938 
by Ronald Way the Director of Fort Henry, which looks out over Navy and Deadman 
Bays.  In the years since, numerous attempts have been made to conclusively identify the 
wrecks.  Archaeological interest in the wrecks has fallen into two categories: research for 
the purpose of identification, and the removal of objects and scantling from the wrecks 
for the purpose of display.  This second category includes the work of Ronald Way (who 
removed timbers and other articles for display at Fort Henry) and numerous recreational 
divers looking for souvenirs.  These wrecks, while now considered boring by most of the 
local sport diving community, were at one time the location of cannon ball hunts.  The 
wrecks may also have been the targets of underwater demolition exercises carried out by 
cadets from the Royal Military College (located on the site previously occupied by the 
Royal Navy Dockyards).  Given the attention the two frigates have received in the past, it 
is surprising that Wreck Baker is so well preserved today.
Archaeological work on the wrecks began in February of 1938, during the 
restoration of Fort Henry, when Ronald Way created a work platform on the ice above 
the wrecks and used a hard-hat diver to recovered artifacts from the wrecks in Deadman 
Bay.  The finds included 17 cannon (likely used as ballast), a copper lantern, a copper 
covered powder tray, seamen’s boarding pikes, bayonets that had been stuck in the 
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planking, and parts of the ship including two mast steps.  The recovered mast steps must 
have come from Wreck Baker as Able’s mast steps are still in place.
In 1952, Dr. Richard A. Preston of the Royal Military College published a paper 
in Historic Kingston entitled “The Fate of Kingston's Warships.”  Preston's paper was 
based on historical research coupled with information gathered during 12 dives by 
Lieutenant-Commander W.H. Willson, a diver from the Royal Military College who was 
the first to designate the wreck in the shallow water at the head of the bay 'Wreck Able', 
and the deeper one 'Wreck Baker'.  Willson recorded the lengths of Wrecks Able and 
Baker at 93 and 134 feet (28.35 and 40.84 meters) respectively.  Preston tells us that 
three wrecks, two large wrecks and one small, were found in Deadman Bay and that 
during Ronald Way's investigation the wrecks were well enough preserved that the diver 
was able to enter beneath the lower deck of the Wreck Baker.116  Unfortunately, today 
little evidence of this deck remains.
Preston used the data he gathered to make the first attempt at identifying the 
remains in Deadman Bay.  He identified Wreck Able as Montreal and Wreck Baker as 
Prince Regent (Kingston).117  It is unfortunate that he had the wrong measurement for 
Wreck Able as it made the rest of his otherwise logical argument flawed and led him to 
an incorrect conclusion.  Preston began to doubt his own conclusions and, in 1960, 
maritime historian John R. Stevens visited the wrecks producing a sketch plan of Wreck 
Able done from the surface.  He came to the correct conclusion that Wreck Able was not 
Montreal but Prince Regent.118  The identity of Wreck Baker was to remain a mystery.119
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In 1987 a Kingston marine heritage organization, “Preserve Our Wrecks” 
revisited and surveyed the Deadman Bay wrecks, concluding that Wreck Able was 
Prince Regent and tentatively identifying Baker as Psyche.120  Parks Canada Marine 
Archaeologist Jonathan Moore, who took part in the 1987 survey, has continued in the 
footsteps of Preston, conducting numerous dives on the wrecks and into the Canadian 
and British archives.  Between 1995 and 1998 a photographic survey of the wrecks was 
conducted as part of a larger survey spurred on by the advance of zebra mussels into the 
Great Lakes.  Preliminary archaeological work was also continued by Moore between 
1999 and 2002 that involved remeasuring the length and breadth of the remaining 
timbers, taking careful measurement of the mast steps removed from Wreck Baker, 
further photographic recording, and archaeological examination.  Moore measured the 
wrecks at 160 feet 7 inches (48.95 meters) for Wreck Able and 131 feet 8 inches (40.13 
meters) for Wreck Baker.  Using these measurements, Moore concluded Wreck Able is 
Prince Regent (Kingston), the largest of the three frigates.  When compared to the as-
built lines planes taken by Thomas Strickland, Moore's length measurement is too large 
to be either Princess Charlotte, with a gun deck of 121 feet (36.88 meters), or Psyche, 
with a gun deck measurement of 130 feet (39.62 meters), and too small to belong to the 
first-rate ship St. Lawrence with a gun deck length of 191 feet 2 inches (58.27 meters). 
His measurement of Wreck Able most closely fits Thomas Strickland's lines plan of 
Prince Regent (Kingston) that recorded a gun deck  length of 155 feet 10 inch (47.24 
meters). Moore was also able to match his archaeological measurements of the mast step 
53
spacing to Strickland's plan.121  Moore identified Wreck Baker as Princess Charlotte 
(Burlington), as its length measured at 131 feet 8 inches (40.13 meters) is too great to be 
either Montreal (ex-Sir George Prevost, ex-Wolfe) or Charwell (ex-Beckwith), and not 
long enough to be Prince Regent.  Moore concluded that, based on the length he 
recorded for Wreck Baker, it could only be Princess Charlotte and the extreme deadrise 
indicated by the shape of the removed mast steps echoes that of Princess Charlotte in 
Strickland’s lines plan.  He therefore concluded that Wreck Baker is Princess Charlotte. 
However, in order to prove his hypothesis Moore felt that a more detailed study of 
Wreck Baker was necessary.
4.2 Archaeological Field Work on Wreck Baker in 2000
In 2000, at the suggestion of Jonathan Moore, an in-depth archaeological study of 
Wreck Baker was undertaken by a team of three Texas A&M students including the 
author.  This study carried on from the point where Moore’s work left off.  The work 
focused on providing further archaeological evidence to support or disprove the 
preliminary conclusion that Wreck Baker is Princess Charlotte and to document the 
construction of one of the three frigates built in Upper Canada by the Royal Navy. 
During the 2000 field season the stem and stern assemblies were recorded along with the 
full length of the keelson, the cross chocks, 13 frame sections, and particularly 
interesting timbers including a breasthook and a transom piece that had become 
disassociated from the rest of the wreck.
The majority of the field work was conducted during the month of July 2000 by 
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Texas A&M students Daniel Walker, Amy Borgens Cramer, and Adam Kane.  Ben Ford, 
an intern at the Lake Champlain Maritime Museum, was also able to spend a few days 
on the site.  Prior to the start of field work a 'Licence to Conduct Archaeological 
Exploration Survey or Field Work' was obtained from the Ontario Ministry of 
Citizenship Culture and Recreation.  This licence stated that “No silt, corrosion, or any 
other surface covering on or around the vessel, its equipment or machinery, shall be 
removed or disturbed.”122  In keeping with the limited scope of the licence no excavation 
was undertaken.  Fortunately, the majority of the scantlings are accessible without any 
excavation being required.  
Wreck Baker lies in shallow water oriented with the bow to the east in 11 feet 9 
inches (3.6m) of water and the stern in 14 feet 9 inches (4.5m), though this changes 
according to the weather.  The water clarity in Deadman Bay was good with visibility up 
to 20 feet (6.01 meters) at the beginning of the season; however, by the end of the second 
week, although still good, it had decreased due to the seasonal algae bloom.  The water 
temperature averaged 65 degrees Fahrenheit (18.3 degrees Celsius) due to unseasonably 
cold and overcast summer weather.  Fortunately, thunderstorms or unworkable 
conditions never interrupted the diving schedule.  The site itself was reached from shore 
via a guide rope held down with cement core weights.  The swim along the line took 
approximately 5 minutes with the diver arriving at the bow of the wreck.  The site was 
marked during diving operations by three flags, one at the bow, one at the stern, and a 
third flag attached about half way along the length of the wreck.  The middle flag was 
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brought in at the end of each day and retied again the next morning.  
The first tasks of the excavation season involved laying a baseline tape along the 
length of the keelson and assigning numbers to the frame sets. The frame sets were 
numbered from 1-47, starting from stem to stern.  The futtocks were differentiated using 
the system set out by J. Richard Steffy in Wooden Shipbuilding and the Interpretation of 
Shipwrecks.  For example, on frame set 13 the cross chock was labeled 13-0, the first 
port futtock 13-1, and the first starboard futtock 13-2; from this point the port futtocks 
were assigned consecutive odd numbers and the starboard futtocks received even 
numbers.123  Once this was done the recording of the keelson, bow, and stern 
construction was undertaken.  These tasks, along with the recording of the first frame 
sections with a goniometer, kept the team busy for most of the first week.  The 
goniometer consisted of an electronic level sealed inside a waterproof housing for use 
underwater.  To record a frame, a tape was laid down along its length and the goniometer 
then placed on the tape, the number displayed was recorded along with the location on 
the tape.  An overall plan of the site was prepared by Amy Borgens, who floated above 
the site and sketched the wreck section by section (figure 7).  After returning from the 
site at the end of the day the sketched sections were transferred onto a larger site plan 
and any errors in scale corrected.    
The evenings were spent testing the data gathered during the workday and 
planning upcoming dives.  Testing the data involved drafting scale drawing of the notes 
taken underwater onto graph paper in order to discover any errors in measurement prior 
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to the conclusion of the field season.  The final task of the evening was preparation of 
slates for the next day's recording.  At the beginning of the field season five slates were 
prepared by attaching two mechanical pencils to a plastic clipboard.  Every evening 
mylar was attached to the front and backsides of the slates with duct tape; the boards 
could then be used to record data underwater.  At the end of the three and one-half week 
long field season the site was cleaned up by removing the tags used to identify the 
frames, the dive flags were removed, and the rope guide between the site and the shore 
was untied and reeled in.
4.3 Construction
As with any study of a wooden-hulled ship, there are certain features common to 
all ships and others that surprise archaeologists working on them.  Most scholarship 
concerned with the building of ships deals with an idealized form of ship construction as 
put forth by the treatises in vogue during the period of the vessel being studied.  Nautical 
archaeology reveals that in many cases the idealized forms in contemporary publications 
were merely that, with numerous factors such as materials, tools, and unique 
circumstances causing builders to stray from the ideal. The two Royal Navy frigates 
lying in the shallow waters of Deadman Bay are excellent examples of shipwrights 
straying from the ideal.  
The majority of the wreck sits proud of the bottom and zebra mussels completely 
cover the hull obscuring many construction details.  Wreck Baker is intact along the 
length of the keelson from stem to stern.  The frames on the starboard side are complete 
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up to the turn of the bilge but have for the most part broken away from the keel-keelson 
assembly revealing the details of their unique construction.  To port, the frames extend 
past the turn of the bilge and, because the ship settled on the bottom listing to port, they 
are still largely attached to the keelson.  A line of bolts and associated clamp timbers that 
indicate the location of the orlop deck extend from the upper faces of the port frame 
timbers.  Numerous timbers detached from the upper works of the ship now lie in the 
hold and are particularly abundant near the stern on the port side, making recording of 
the frames in this area impossible without extensive digging and shifting.  The planking 
has pulled away from the stem allowing access to construction details, but this is not the 
case at the stern where the lower strakes are still in place.  Two gudgeons remain 
attached to the stern post although the rudder is missing.  The hull appears to have been 
constructed entirely with iron fasteners (there was no sign of treenails or copper 
fasteners).  The main- and fore-mast steps were removed by Ronald Way in February 
1938 and now reside at Fort Henry and at the Marine Museum of the Great Lakes at 
Kingston.  A portion of the keelson is missing where it begins to rise towards the stern, 
perhaps due to recovery by museum personnel or destruction during military demolition 
exercises.  The archaeological data indicate that the keel has broken at this point.  As 
well as the detached timbers that have settled within the confines of the wreck, there is a 
debris field around the perimeter of the site that includes many disassociated futtocks as 
well as a transom timber abaft the stern post.  The wood species identifications discussed 
below are based on a small sample from each scantling type and are by no means 
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definitive (Appendix A).  However, during the detailed study of the wrecks done by the 
author there was no evidence to suggest variation in wood species amongst similar 
elements. 
4.3.1 The Keel
The white oak keel of the frigate was 121 feet 4 inches (36.97 m) long, 16 inches 
(40 cm) moulded and 12 inches (30 cm) sided.  The upper face of the keel is notched so 
that the made floors average 4 inches (10 cm) lower than the first futtocks.  This allowed 
the made floors to be held securely in place by the keel rising up to meet the first 
futtocks.  On each side, the rabbet that fit the inboard edge of the garboard strake is 3 
inches (7.62 cm) wide along the face of the keel and 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) deep.  The 
rabbet is located approximately 1-inch (2.54 cm) below the bottom of the cross-chocks. 
The scarfs on the keel were buried in the sediment and not visible, and the false keel, 2.5 
inches (3.75 cm) moulded, was visible for less than 6 inches (15 cm) at the stern but was 
buried for the rest of its length.  It is likely that scarfs similar to those found on the 
keelson were used to assemble the individual pieces of the keel.  During attempts to 
reconstruct the ship on paper it became apparent that the keel had fractured at the point 
where the deadwood begins to rise towards the stern post.  This fact is not apparent to an 
observer swimming over the wreck.  The after extremity of the keel (visible above the 
sediment) revealed a fishplate that joins the keel to the sternpost.  The keel terminates in 
a skeg that protected the forward edge of the rudder in case the ship ran aground. 
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4.3.2 The Stem
The stem was built using straight timbers that were cut, shaped, and joined to be 
used in place of compass timbers.  It consists of eight large white oak timbers fastened 
together with 1-inch (2.5 cm) diameter bolts (figure 8).  The joint of the gripe, the stem, 
and the knee of the head, along with a wedge-shaped timber between them, are fastened 
together by a pair of circular iron bands bolted together from opposite sides of the gripe. 
This circular band serves the same function as the more conventional horseshoe plate, 
but serves to reinforce the extra timbers required by the lack of compass timber on the 
lakes.  The inner portion of the stem consists of two apron timbers and one large stemson 
timber.  Cant frames were fastened directly to the apron using more 1-inch (2.5 cm) 
bolts.  The two inner stem posts were rabetted to fit the ends of the planking.
Figure 8. Bow assembly from starboard. (drawing by Daniel Walker).
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4.3.3 The Stern
It is unfortunate that at the stern five strakes of planking on the starboard side 
conceal most of the deadwood construction from view (figure 9).  The white oak 
sternpost, 13 1/8 inches (36 cm) moulded, and 12 inches (30 cm) sided, rises13 feet 9 
inches (420 cm) from the keel at an angle of 91 degrees.  The inner sternpost, moulded 
15 inches (38 cm) by 12 inches sided (30 cm), is notched at a height of 12 feet 2 inches 
(370 cm) for the first transom, which was held in place with a single 1-inch (2.5 cm) 
bolt.  Immediately above this, another bolt would have held a notched transom piece. 
Just aft of the stern, lying on the bottom, is a transom timber that has broken away.  The 
size of this piece suggests it was originally higher up in the hull than the current hieght 
of the posts.  
Figure 9. Stern from starboard. (drawing by Daniel Walker).
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The deadwood knee rises to a height of 11 feet 2 inches (340 cm) on the inner 
sternpost and abuts the keelson assembly at its forward end.  A rectangular impression in 
the top of the deadwood indicates the location of a deckbeam stanchion.  Two wrought-
iron gudgeons remain at heights of 3 feet 9 inches (114 cm) and 10 feet 6 inches (320 
cm) from the base of the keel.  Although both gudgeons are 8 inches (20.3 cm) wide, the 
straps of the lower one are longer at 5 feet (152 cm) than the straps of the upper one at 3 
feet 6 inches (107 cm).  A triangular iron pintle stop, or 'dumb brace', is located 7 inches 
(17.8 cm) beneath the higher gudgeon and measures 15 1/8 inches (38.5 cm) in length. 
Unfortunately, the rudder is missing and may well have been removed prior to the 
sinking of the ship.
4.3.4 The Frames
 Wreck Baker had a unique method of constructing the white oak frames that 
affected other elements of the ship's construction. Three types of frames were used in the 
construction of the ship.  Ten cant frame per side were bolted to the stem timbers at the 
bow, followed by 47 full-frame sets and, finally, at the stern nine half frames were bolted 
to the deadwood.  Sections were taken at frame sets 2, 4, 13, 18, 19, 25, 27, 29, as well 
as at cant frames 1 and 5, the third half-frame forward from the stern and also one of the 
frames that had become detached from a cross chock on frame set 41-47.  The number of 
sections that could be taken was limited by the stipulation in the archaeological licence 
that prevented disturbing the overlying timbers.  
The ship was heavily framed with less than 1.5 inches (4 cm) of space between 
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frames. Each frame consisted of a pieced-together or 'made' floor next to a first futtock. 
At the keel, the made floors averaged 12 inches (30 cm) sided and 16 inches (40 cm) 
moulded, and were bolted to first futtocks of the same dimensions (figures 10 and 11). 
The made floors were constructed by attaching two frame timbers to either side of a 
cross-chock using three bolts per side (figure 12).  The cross-chock and its associated 
frame timbers fit together with vertical scarfs that extend from the keel centerline to the 
outer ends of the cross-chock.  A 1-inch (2.5 cm) diameter bolt driven through the 
keelson, cross-chock, and into the keel fastened each made frame assembly into place. 
The individual cross-chocks, while maintaining the same basic form, differ in their 
dimensions.  Each cross-chock fit its corresponding frame timbers very tightly.  This 
means that rather than cutting chocks and notches to pre-determined shapes they were all 
custom cut and formed as individual units and fitted together as such.  No chock could 
be used with a different set of timbers than the ones it had been cut for.  The heels of the 
first futtocks were notched to fit over the keel, and a simple triangular unfastened chock 
was placed atop the futtock heels to fill in the space between the frame and keelson.  
In many cases the made floors were not notched over the keel, but instead the top 
surface of the keel was notched to fit the floors.  Forward of the midship frames, the 
cross-chocks are positioned aft of the adjoining timbers and, aft of midships, they are 
positioned forward of the attached timbers.  The first futtocks are always on the same 
side as the chocks.  This means that at midships there is a single first futtock between 
two made-floors (figure 13).
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Figure 12.  Frame expansion from above. (drawing by Daniel Walker).
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Figure 13. Framing pattern at midships. (drawing by Daniel Walker). 
The ship is preserved on the port side up to the third futtock.  The butt of the first 
futtock head and the third futtock heel is reinforced with a chock.  This simple chock 
was attached to the corresponding futtocks using four iron spikes.  All other frame 
connections were accomplished by simple butt joins.  Outboard of the chocks, between 
the first and third futtocks, are a series of bolts that appear to have held the orlop deck 
structure in place.  In some locations wood fragment that resemble broken lodging knees 
are still attached to the bolts. 
The six frame sets furthest aft (41-47) are somewhat different from the rest 
(figure 14).  As the deadrise increased towards the stern the builders modified the made- 
floor system to accommodate it.  The cross chocks of these frames increase in sided 
dimensions compared to their counterparts further forward and they are notched on their 
after face.  The attached timbers are correspondingly notched on the forward face and the 
cross chocks are attached to the frame timbers with four large bolts (figure 15).  The 
timbers are joined so that the outboard face of the assembly has a constant sided 
dimension.  The timbers attached to the chock do not cross the keel but rather rest their 
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heels against the deadwood below the chock.  On the made floor of this type furthest 
forward in the stern, the area below the chock forms a triangle with the interior face 
resting against the deadwood, the outboard face against the planking, and the upper face 
against the chock.  As they proceed further aft and the deadwood rises, this triangular 
shape is maintained at the base but there is more rectangular frame between the chock 
and the triangle at the base.  Between adjacent made floors there is a first futtock with its 
heel bolted to the side of the deadwood.  Aft of frame set 47 there are nine half frames 
that  butt against the sides of the deadwood.
Figure 14.  Stern frame showing inboard and after faces. (drawing by Daniel 
Walker).
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Figure 15. Stern frame expansion. (drawing by Daniel Walker).
The frames attached to the bow assembly forward of the keel and keelson are 
canted forward at ever increasing angles and attached to the stem timbers with large 1-
inch (2.5 cm) diameter iron bolts.  These cant frames are typically found in bow 
construction.  As the angles changed filler pieces were sometimes necessary, these were 
not attached to the stem but rather bolted to the adjacent frames.  
The curious tripartite system of constructing the floors allowed for smaller 
individual timbers to be used in the construction of the floors and also permitted greater 
deadrise than would have been possible using a single timber for the floor.  It may have 
been instituted due to a lack of good compass timber of the proper dimensions.  Howard 
Chappelle states “the lake frigates had their capacity much reduced by means of great 
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deadrise, intended to make them fast and weatherly.  The Princess Charlotte was 
extreme in this respect.”124  It may also have been instituted to save time but this seems 
unlikely as the tight fit between the cross chocks and frame timbers and their lack of 
uniformity suggests a labor-intensive process.  
4.3.5 The Keelson
The keelson begins at the stemson and runs to the deadwood knee at the stern.  It 
was an assembly of five white oak timbers measuring12 5/8 inches (32 cm) moulded and 
12 inches (30 cm) sided, capped over by four smaller white oak timbers measuring 5 1/2 
inches (14 cm) moulded by 12 inches (30 cm) sided that make up the rider keelson 
(figure 16).  The rider keelson is fastened to the keelson using spikes that were driven on 
alternate sides of the keelson centerline.  All keelson timbers were flat scarfed together 
and bolted in place.  Although the rider keelson hides the exact bolting pattern, it is clear 
that a bolt was driven from the keelson through each cross chock and into the keel.  The 
keelson does not curve up at the bow but rather runs straight, ending abruptly at the 
stemson (figure 17).  The keelson is not notched as the upper surfaces of the frames were 
flush.  
The upper surface of the rider keelson was notched to accept the stanchions 
supporting the lower deck beams.  The markings on the top of the rider keelson indicate 
that the stanchions were inserted after the installation of the deck beams had been 
completed.  The impressions in the rider get deeper as they move aft suggesting that the 
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tops of the stanchions were placed into position against the deck beams and then 
hammered at the base until vertical between the deck beam and the rider keelson.  The 
stanchion positions noted during the recording of the wreck provide important 
information concerning the placement of the deck beams as well as suggesting the 
locations of the mast steps and the hatches in the deck above.  
At the point where the deadwood begins the keelson timber curves downwards 
and has broken apart (figure 17).  This timber is the last before the deadwood begins and 
should lie straight.  It appears to have been distorted by the forces that led to the fracture 
of the keel and the splaying of the timbers at the forward end of the deadwood.  The start 
of the rising deadwood is indicated by an increase in the moulded dimensions of the 
keelson and the insertion of a deadwood timber beneath its after end.  The shape of the 
enlarged keelson timber forces the rider keelson to begin to curve up towards the stern. 
Unfortunately, the after portions of the transitional keelson and rider keelson timbers 
have been destroyed.  
4.3.6 The Mast Steps
Two mast steps were removed from the wreck by Ronald Way's salvage team in 
1938 and were recorded by Jonathan Moore at Fort Henry, the National Historic Site of 
Canada that overlooks Deadman Bay (one of these is now on display at the Great Lakes 
Maritime Museum in Kingston).  The two mast steps are of similar construction. Both 
are  made of four timbers, approximately 12 inches (30 cm) square bolted together using 
four fish plates with four 1-inch (2.5 cm) diameter bolts between each pair and four 
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vertical bolts, two per timber (figure 18).  The mast steps were notched over the keelson 
and attached to the frames using the four vertical bolts, two per side.  The foremast step's 
outboard edges are angled to accommodate the lateral shape of the ship as well as the 
deadrise.
Wreck Baker's 'saddle' mast steps are a type common to 18th-century British and 
British colonial built vessels.  Similar steps have been found on other lake warships, 
including the 16-gun sloop Boscawen built on Lake Champlain in 1759 and the schooner 
Nancy built on the upper Great Lakes in 1789.125
4.3.7  Knees
Two knees 3 ¾ inches (9.5 cm) thick can be found in the jumble of scantlings 
detached from the hull near the stern on the port side of the wreck.  Their orientation 
suggests that they are associated with the bolts that mark the location of the orlop deck. 
They are therefore identified as lodging knees.  The distance between the two, 6 feet 4 
inches (193 cm), correlates with the positions of the deck beams shown by the location 
of the stanchion notches in the rider keelson.  The knee recorded (figure 19) was attached 
to the frames with three 1-inch (2.5 cm) diameter bolts.  Two more of these bolts were 
used to attach the knee to the deck beam.  These two bolts were driven straight through 
and a third bolt was toed in where the knee bends.  The toed-in bolt angled up and aft 
towards the deck beam. An indentation 6 inches (15.2 cm) long and less than a ½ inch 
(1.25 cm) deep indicates the location of a ledge.  The timbers that have accumulated 
around them likely preserved the two knees at the stern. There is evidence that knees 
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further forward  have been broken or eroded away so that they are no longer easily 
recognizable as such.  However, in some cases these timbers become thicker as they 
proceed aft suggesting that they were once lodging knees.
Figure 19.  Bottom of a lodging knee recorded on the port side of the keelson 
near the stern. (drawing by Daniel Walker).
4.3.8  Other Reinforcing Timbers
A timber identified as a breasthook was found on the port side near the stem 
(figure 20).  This timber would have been attached to the stem and the cant frames by 
eleven 1-inch (2.5 cm) diameter bolts to reinforce this point of stress.  Two transom 
timbers that would have performed a similar duty at the stern were located, one still 
bolted in place and the other resting on the lake bed, aft of the stern post (figure 21).  The 
shape of the transom pieces provide a clue to the shape of the ship at the stern.
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Figure 20.  Breasthook found on port side near bow. (drawing by Daniel 
Walker).
Figure 21. Two transom timbers. (drawing by Daniel Walker).
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4.3.9  Ceiling Planking
Ceiling planking is evident on the port side, and much of it is still in place 
making recording of the frames problematic.  At midship there are 16 white oak ceiling 
planks between the keelson and the clamp.  The ceiling strakes are between 8 5/8 inches 
(22 cm) and 12 5/8 inches (32 cm) wide and 1-inch (2.5 cm) thick.  Careful examination 
of the ceiling planking revealed that at frame 32, a semi-circular notch had been cut out 
of the first ceiling plank to port of the keelson.  Unfortunately, its twin to starboard is no 
longer in situ so it can not be confirmed if this was true on both sides of the ship.  The 
semi-circular notch is 15 ¾ inches (37.5 cm) by 7 1/16 inches (18 cm), and likely 
indicates the location of a 15 inch (38 cm) diameter bilge pump used for removing water 
from the hold.  The bilge pump would have typically extended down between the frames 
to the hull planking.  Due to the tight frame spacing in this ship, however, the pump had 
to sit atop the frames.  
4.3.10  Hull Planking
The hull planks were butt joined and attached to the hull with 7½ inch (19 cm) 
long spikes placed diagonally, two per frame.  The hull planking at the turn of the bilge 
is 12 inches (30.5 cm) wide by 3 inches (7.6 cm) thick, while at the stern the garboard 
and the two adjoining strakes are 20 inches (51 cm) wide at the sternpost and narrow 
slightly as they move forward.  The fourth strake from the keel is smaller at 16 inches 
(40.6 cm) and the fifth and sixth strakes again become 20 inches (51 cm) wide.  The 
stern plank at the fourth strake appears to meet a stealer at its forward end.  
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4.3.11  Fasteners
The ship was built entirely with iron fasteners.  The large timbers that make up 
the skeleton of the ship were held together with 1-inch (2.5 cm) diameter drift bolts 
driven through pre-drilled holes.  This method of securing the timbers together is 
extremely strong.  When the wood becomes wet it swells and the iron bolts are locked in 
place.  Smaller hull timbers, including the ceiling and hull planking were fastened using 
iron spikes of various lengths.  The only evidence of a treenail was found in frame 13, 
where it appears to have been used as a plug for a knot hole rather than as a fastener.  
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5 PUTTING IT BACK TOGETHER AGAIN
5.1  Reconstruction
In order to analyze the construction of Wreck Baker it is first necessary to 
reconstruct it on paper.  To do this, timbers separated by 180 years of natural and human 
disturbance must be realigned and pieced together as drawings.  As a first step the stem, 
stern, and keelson were reconstructed from the archaeological data.  Once these elements 
had been drafted independently and rejoined, the frames were placed atop the keel and 
their shapes were reconstructed.  With this data the three-dimensional shape of the ship 
was drafted to create a set of ships lines.  Such a summary of the reconstruction process 
naturally glosses over many of the challenges that arose along the way.  This section of 
the thesis will describe the re-assembly process and what it reveals to us about Wreck 
Baker.  The frames will now be referred to in the traditional manner the builders would 
have used.  Frames aft of midships are labeled numerically and those forward of 
midships labeled alphabetically (see conversion chart Appendix C).  
The stem was easily reconstructed, as many of its timbers remain in their original 
positions while those out of place were repositioned based on their unique shapes and the 
locations of the bolts used to fasten them together.  The keelson and rider keelson were 
also reconstructed without difficulty as both, with the exception of a few small gaps, 
remained intact as far aft as frame 22 where the keelson begins to rise to accommodate 
the stern deadwood.  The reconstruction of the stern aft of frame 22 was more difficult. 
Although the sternpost is completely visible down to the skeg, forward of this the keel 
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quickly disappears beneath sediment and debris.  The reconstruction was further 
complicated by the deadwood structure being concealed by hull planking.  It was 
possible to reconstruct the upper deadwood configuration from measurements taken 
where one of the hull planks was missing but unfortunately the lower deadwood was 
inaccessible for such an examination. 
The next step, the 'assembly' of the stem, keelson, and stern sections was 
exacerbated by the fact that the construction features were concealed at the stern. 
Joining the stem to the keelson was straightforward as the two sections, except for a 
small gap that had formed, were still 'as built'.  Reassembling the stern and the keelson 
was more problematic.  When the two sections were fit together, the keel did not line up. 
After re-examining the data and checking for errors the source of the problem revealed 
itself.  As the keel is not visible for much of the distance between the stern and frame 23, 
the lower deadwood hidden by planking, and the timbers at the end of the keelson broken 
and dislocated, it was not obvious during the field work that the keel is broken between 
frames 26 and 27.  This epiphany lead to a rethinking of the relationship between the 
stern and keelson that produced a much more viable reconstruction.  The final 
reconstruction provided for more rise in the keelson at the stern, thereby allowing room 
for more deadwood and creating a stronger, more plausible stern construction.
Once the backbone of the ship had been reconstructed, it was necessary to 
determine the shape of the hull.  To accomplish this, the 14 frame sections taken in the 
field were drafted and properly positioned over the length of the keel to provide a 
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representation of the ship as built.  While the port frames are still bolted to the cross 
chocks, the angle at which they meet the keel and keelson is slightly distorted due to a 
twist along the length of the keel and keelson structure.  The starboard frames have 
broken away and lie on the sand next to the keel.  Unfortunately, many of the port frames 
could not be recorded due to the debris on top of them.  As a result, most of the sections 
were taken on the disjointed starboard frames.  Frame A, one frame forward of midships, 
was recorded on both sides of the keel, and the port frame appears to be close to its 
original position.
A number of clues were used to determine the correct angle of deadrise for the 
frames, one of the first being the angle of deadrise where a frame met the keel.  It was 
assumed that the frame would sit flat on the keel and it was positioned on paper in this 
manner.  Another clue was the position of the bolts that held the deck structure in place. 
The depth of hold was known for both Princess Charlotte and Psyche, and the frames 
were placed so that they coincided with the historical data.   The maximum moulded 
breadth on Psyche's lines is 35 feet 4 inches (10.77 meters), while on Princess Charlotte 
the maximum moulded breadth is shown as 37 feet 2 inches (11.33 meters).  In order to 
achieve the narrower breadth of Psyche, the angle of deadrise would have to be 
increased, yielding a frame section that differed considerably from the recorded lines. 
The same is true for the depth of hold, for on Psyche the depth of hold is 10 feet 3 inches 
(3.12 meters).  In order to achieve this, the archaeologically recorded frames would have 
to be positioned in such a way that the deadrise would increase further, making it even 
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less likely to be Psyche.  When frames A, L, 5, 7, and 11 were positioned instead to 
replicate the depth of hold recorded for Princess Charlotte (8 feet 8½  inches or 2.65 
meters), although the deadrise was less severe than that found in the Strickland plan, the 
maximum breadth for Princess Charlotte was replicated.  The less severe deadrise might 
be accounted for by changes in the frame shapes due to distortion as the wreck settled on 
the bottom and fell apart over time. 
Although little of the orlop deck remains, several features do reveal its 
construction.  Rectangular notches in the top of the rider keelson provide the locations of 
the deck stanchions and the deck beams they supported.  A series of bolts show the 
location of the lodging knees that supported the orlop deck.  As we have seen, only two 
complete lodging knees were found on the wreck, located near the stern, though the 
badly damaged remains of others along with the bolts that held them in place can be 
found along the length of the wreck.  Notches placed on the inboard face of the recorded 
lodging knees indicate the existence of ledges between the deck beams. Interestingly, the 
plans of St. Lawrence show a similar construction with lodging knees between the beams 
on the orlop deck, though absent on the decks above, and without evidence of hanging 
knees.  Other than the lodging knees there is no evidence of knees among the remains of 
Wreck Baker.  
Although Wreck Baker's saddle-type mast steps were removed from the wreck, 
their positions are indicated by bolts driven through the rider keelson.  One bolt was 
placed fore and aft of each mast step and driven through the rider keelson and the other 
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central timbers to provide additional support for the masts.  The foremast step was 
located over frames L and M  and the mainmast step was positioned over frames 13 and 
14.  The heads of these bolts are flush with the top of the rider keelson, indicating that 
they were designed to strengthen the structure at this point rather than securing some 
type of block or chock in place.   The shape of the mast steps also helped to determine 
the deadrise of the lower hull. 
The stem, keelson, stern, and frames provided the principal evidence for 
determining the overall shape of the ship, but numerous smaller timbers and details were 
also noted and taken into consideration.  The two transoms, one still bolted in place and 
the other lying in the sand behind the wreck, allowed the curvature of the ship at the 
stern to be accurately reconstructed.
5.2  Analysis
To determine the identification of Wreck Baker, the archaeological record needs 
to be compared to the historical record of the two candidates whose lengths are similar to 
that of Wreck Baker, Psyche and Princess Charlotte.  Fortunately, lines plans exist for 
both ships.  These plans provide information on the length, breadth, and shape of the 
ships that can be compared with the archaeological data.  Three separate plans are 
available that shed light on the identity of the wreck.  The first is a plan of Psyche drafted 
for the Admiralty December 1813 (figure 22), the other two plans purportedly represent 
Princess Charlotte.
The plan of Princess Charlotte, drafted by John Goudie in 1813 (figure 23), 
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depicts a frigate with little deadrise, a classic ocean-going shape, that is in stark contrast 
with the Princess Charlotte lines taken from the hull and drafted by Thomas Strickland 
in 1815.  The Strickland plan depicts a frigate with extreme deadrise, with hold space so 
limited that it could only have operated on the Great Lakes (figure 24).  There are several 
questionable features regarding the identification of Goudie's plan as Princess Charlotte 
(in addition to its marked difference from the Strickland plan recording the ship as built 
in 1815).  Script above the stern of the frigate records “John Goudie/ Marine Architect/ 
Quebec Canada 1813” and then, in another hand, smaller writing over the bow identifies 
the draft as Princess Charlotte.  Forward of the half breadth two lines of fainter script 
read Prince Regent /Princess Charlotte.  It is possible that this draft was rediscovered 
after a significant time had elapsed and an effort was made based on its features and date 
to identify the illustrated frigate.  Thus, it is possible that the identification as Princess 
Charlotte was erroneous.  It is also possible that Goudie began with this design in mind 
in 1813, but that the design was significantly changed prior to the assembly of the 
frames.  Since the 1813 Goudie plan differs greatly in its hull form from Wreck Baker, 
the archaeological data must be compared to the similar forms seen in the Admiralty plan 
of Psyche and the Strickland plan of Princess Charlotte.  
The lines produced from the archaeological data (figure 25) reveal a ship with a 
sharp deadrise similar to, although not as extreme as, that found on the Strickland plan. 
Once reconstructed, the length of Wreck Baker's keel comes to 121 feet 4 inches (36.98 
meters) a length that falls between those recorded for Princess Charlotte as 118 feet 
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(35.97 meters) and Psyche 125 feet (38.10 meters).  There is evidence that the Princess 
Charlotte lines drafted by Strickland may be inaccurate in some respects.  While the 
length of the keel is stated as 100 feet (30.48 meters) on the plan, the actual 
measurement is 118 feet (35.97 meters).  Significantly, a later historical document lists 
the keel at 121 feet 6 inches (37.03meters),126 an almost exact match with 121 feet 4 
inches (36.98 meters) derived from the archaeological data.  In addition, the shape of the 
lower bow, as recorded archaeologically, is an almost exact match to that on Strickland's 
plan of Princess Charlotte and very different from the bow of Psyche (figure 26).
The stern posts of both Psyche and Princess Charlotte, shown in the lines 
drawings, differ from the archaeological data in the number of gudgeons used.  The 
archaeological remains held only two gudgeons within a span that both historical plans 
show as having three (figures 22, 24, and 25).  This may be explained by the fact that 
when the Strickland plan was produced, the ship was in the water and the view of the 
stern post was obscured.  In the case of Psyche, the builders may have strayed from the 
plan somewhat since the ship was built in England and then disassembled for shipment 
to the Kingston Naval Yard.  There would not have been the same constraints on 
materials in Britain as in Kingston.  This different gudgeon configuration may indicate 
the ship was built entirely in Kingston rather than merely assembled there.
The construction observed on the wreck can also be used to draw conclusions 
about its identity.  The materials included in the hull indicate that good compass timber 
was not available when the ship was built.  The frames, stem, and stern are all
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Figure 26.  The reconstructed stem overlying those from the proposed draught of 
Psyche and Strickland's 1815 lines taken of Princess Charlotte.
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constructed out of straight timbers bolted together to form the complex shapes required 
in ship construction (figures 27 and 28).  It is noteworthy that this lack of compass 
timber is also echoed in the unique constructions of both Prince Regent and St.  
Lawrence, as documented by Jonathan Moore (figures 29 and 30).
As part of the photo project conducted by the organization 'Preserve Our Wrecks, 
Kingston', wood samples were taken from a number of timbers, and Moore 
commissioned several drawings based on the information recorded in the photographs. 
When the constructions features of the wrecks known to be the frigate Prince Regent and 
the ship of the line St. Lawrence are compared to those of Wreck Baker, a number of 
similarities become apparent.  The construction plan of St. Lawrence's orlop deck (figure 
31) shows the use of lodging knees and ledges to support the deck rather than hanging 
knees, and is very similar to the orlop deck on Wreck Baker recreated from the 
archaeological data (figure 27).  The lack of knees used in the construction of Wreck 
Baker may be reflected in the survey of  Burlington (ex Princess Charlotte) undertaken 
by Strickland in 1820.  This thorough survey of the ship and the repairs it required makes 
no mention of knees at all (Appendix B).127  While little remains of St. Lawrence, the 
archaeological evidence indicates that its frames were constructed of large, thick, straight 
timbers bolted together in a unique fashion (figure 29).  The better-preserved remains of 
Prince Regent also indicate that the use of compass timbers was avoided by instead 
employing numerous small straight timbers cut and bolted together to create the 
necessary curves. This is particularly evident in the construction of the floors, which
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Figure 28.  Reconstructed section of Wreck Baker at frame A. (drawing by 
Daniel Walker).
95
Figure 29.  Exploded framing view of the construction of St. Lawrence. (drawing 
by F. Werthman).
Figure 30.  Exploded framing view of the construction of Prince Regent. 
(drawing by F. Werthman).
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were made by bolting together four timbers to create the necessary curvature (figure 30).
The wood samples taken by Jonathan Moore show that all three wrecks were 
built using white oak for most of their scantlings (Appendix A).  This suggests that they 
were all built in Kingston and further confirms the identity of Wreck Baker as Princess 
Charlotte.  According to historical documents, Psyche and the other three vessels built in 
England for shipment to Canada were assembled from fir.128  It is possible that the varied 
frame construction seen in the large 1814 warships stems from experimentation with the 
available materials and  timbers to create the strongest vessels possible. 
A lack of fasteners was also noted during the survey of the wreck.  The chocks 
between the first and third futtocks were often not bolted or spiked in place but held by 
ceiling planking or the clamp.  The chocks that sat above the heels of the first futtocks 
and beneath the keelson were similarly unfastened.  This evidence fits the dearth of 
fasteners bemoaned by Richard O'Conor during the construction of Prince Regent and 
Princess Charlotte.129
The unique frame construction, white oak scantlings, the lack of compass timber, 
the comparisons between the archaeologically recorded reconstruction and the 
contemporary record of the length, breadth, and depth of hold reveals Wreck Baker to be 
Princess Charlotte.  
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6 CONCLUSION
Archaeological investigation has proved Wreck Baker to be of both historical and 
archaeological significance.  This vessel, identified as Princess Charlotte, was launched 
from the Royal Navy Dockyard on Lake Ontario during the War of 1812.  It was built 
with the materials available to combat a distinct enemy within a specific arena.  Princess 
Charlotte was designed to exploit the advantages of operating on the lake and to meet 
the heavily constructed and armed American squadron built by Henry Eckford under the 
direction of Commodore Isaac Chauncey.  
This ship and the others built by the Royal Navy in Kingston during the War of 
1812 were designed to dominate the American ships being produced at Sackets Harbor. 
They therefore differed in many ways from the ships Britain was building to blockade 
European ports.  By the time Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte were conceived the 
British had lost three seagoing frigates to the American super frigates.  It appears the 
shipwrights understood that these vessels needed to be built to match the strength of the 
American frigates.  Princess Charlotte was very heavily built with only minimal space 
between the frames.  Prior to the attachment of its planking this ship must have appeared 
very solid and durable.  
The most obvious element that sets Wreck Baker apart from seagoing ships is its 
sharp deadrise.  Operating on the fresh water lakes removed the need to carry drinking 
water and permitted the ship to incorporate the extreme deadrise allowing it to be “fast 
and weatherly,”130 while still able to carry a heavy weight of metal for its class.  Other 
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adaptations were necessitated by the need to quickly build large ships in a remote 
location.  The majority of materials needed at the shipyard to construct, ballast, and arm 
the large ships had to be scavenged or manufactured in the industrialized cities of Lower 
Canada or in Britain, and then shipped to Montreal and from there either transported 
overland or floated up the rapids of the upper St. Lawrence River to Kingston.  This 
constraint, coupled with a lack of good compass timber in the surrounding old growth 
forests, led to the unusual construction of the ship.  The made-floors of Wreck Baker 
avoided the need for large compass timbers.  In addition, there is little evidence of knees 
amongst the timbers that survive today.  While the made floors required six 1-inch (2.5 
cm) bolts per frame set, the chocks both beneath the keelson and between the first and 
third futtocks are not secured except by adjacent timbers (the keelson and the ceiling 
planking respectively).  The lack of knees and fasteners matches the observations of 
Strickland when he surveyed the ships at Kingston following the war.131
The construction of the wreck was influenced by the purpose for which it was 
built as well as by the logistical difficulty in obtaining supplies.  Over the course of the 
war both the British and the Americans increased the size and armament of the ships 
built for operation on the lakes in order to maintain naval parity or gain a short lived 
supremacy.  The penultimate ships designed and built by the British at Kingston during 
this race were the two frigates Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte.  Once outfitted, the 
two warships gave the Royal Navy a short lived supremacy on the lake in the spring of 
1814.  
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Wreck Baker is identified as Princess Charlotte based on the archaeological 
evidence and the comparison of these results with the historical record.  When the shape 
of the hull derived from the archaeological evidence was compared to the lines plans 
from both Princess Charlotte and Psyche, they correlated more closely with those of 
Princess Charlotte.  While the length of the wreck matched neither historical plan, the 
shape of the ship (reconstructed from the archaeological record) closely matched the 
historically recorded dimensions of Princess Charlotte in depth of hold, deadrise, 
maximum breadth, and the shape of the bow.  By the same measure, the reconstruction 
greatly differed from the features and dimensions of Psyche.  The identification of wood 
samples as white oak strongly points to the identification of Wreck Baker as Princess 
Charlotte, and not the fir built frigate Psyche. 
On April 14, 1814 Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte were launched down the 
slipways of Navy Bay.  George Record, the shipwright in charge of designing and 
building Princess Charlotte, had worked near the edge of the British Empire, and had to 
adapt his designs and construction to meet the challenges presented by both the enemy at 
Sackets Harbor and the logistical difficulty of obtaining the necessary desired timber and 
manufactured materials.  Wreck Baker is a testament to the ingenuity, dedication, and 
knowledge of its builder.  From the historical and archaeological evidence presented in 
this thesis it has been shown that the parallel careers of the frigates Princess Charlotte 
and Prince Regent continue to this day as they now lie several hundred feet apart in the 
shallow waters of Deadman Bay near Kingston, Ontario.
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Port of Quebec
Henry Walsh d[itt]o. d[itt]o of timber, masts, and planks, for the town of Three Rivers.”
59 NAC, RG 8 1, 729:8 Record to Prevost, January 14, 1813.
Your humble Petitioner sheweth, that on the 24th of November last, I made application to 
Colonel Breyer for a situation to serve on the Lakes of Upper Canada, either on board of 
one of H. Majesty’s Vessels ,or otherwise in the Ship Yard as may have been required.
Colonel Breyer (from the reference I produced) favor’d me with letters to the 
Commissary and Quarter Master Generals, at Montreal.  On my arrival at that place, 
received information that the former Gentleman was at Quebec, & the latter of his way, 
to Upper Canada, whose return was shortly expected, when my case could be decided on. 
I have since waited the event.  My circumstance bid me pray your excellency’s decision.
I am with the greatest respect
Your Obedient Humble Servant
Geo Record
To His Excellency
Sir George Prevost Willliam Henry
January 14 - 1813
60 NAC, RG 8 1,1220:110.  Record to Freer, January 16, 1813.
To Geo Record My [unknown word) Office Quebec 16 Jan. 1813
Sir,
Sir George Prevost having rec.d your letter of this 4th [unknown 
word] has directed me to inform you that he has never been made acquanted with your 
previous offer of service; but as Col. Baynes, bears testimony of your Capacity to be 
useful in the Public Service, if you are disposed to proceed immediately to Upper 
Canada, his excellency will direct a letter to be furnish’d you to Maj. Gen.’l Sheaffe 
desiring that you may be employ’d then as an Officer in one of the Armed Vessels, or in 
one of the Ship yards in such a situation as you Ability & Pretentions may entitle you to.
I have be
Noah Freer  ms
61 NAC, RG 8 1, 1220:116. January 16,1813. 
62 NAC, RG 8 1, 729:96. Feb 14, 1813.
63 NAC, RG 8 1, 729:113-116. March 11, 1813. 
Point Frederick Kingston
11th March, 1813
Sir
I have the honour to address you in consequence of a very alarming mutiny that 
took place after Roll call this morning in the Dock Yard, amongst the artificers.   They 
nearly to a man refused to work giving some [unknown word] is reasons about 
provisions not having been served to them:  which were completely contradicted by the 
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evidences of the quarter master then present.  Sending entreaties of no avail, I sent to 
Major Heathcote Commanding Officer at this Point,  requesting him to order out an 
officer and 40 men and strive to obtain by compulsory means that unattainable by gentle, 
the artificers being surrounded by the military, I called upon Mr. Allen the Master 
Builder, to point out ringleader, that some example might be timely made.  Mr. Allen 
declined this.  I then told those of the artificers who would work to hold up their hands; 
& seized myself upon four or five of those refusing this signal.  All but one of these 
agreed to work; & the ------ gentleman I have order into confinement.
As this is not the first time I have discovered symptoms of mutinous spirit 
amongst these people I of course have looked around and have employed persons to 
endeavor to trace matters to their source.  I can bring no direct proof but if ever the 
circumstantial had weight I could fix on Mr. Allen as the prime mover of these 
discontents.  He is also an American born subject! [underline in the original]  When 
delicacy and safety lead by different paths, in terms of danger like the present, I need 
hardly insist on to your better judgment the road to be preferred.  
I have therefore to suggest Sir that Mr. Allen be removed from the yard & his 
place filled by the Assistant Builder, Mr. Record than whom I know not a more capable 
man, both in the theory and practice in his profession.
You will I am convinced agree with me that Mr. Allen should not be suffered to 
remain here, after his dismissal.  He can have his accounts sent to Montreal to be settled 
with there by the acting Deputy Quarter Master General Captain Gray.
I have the honor to be Sir
Your most obedient humble servt
J.B. Irwin  Capn
64 NAC, RG 8 1, 729:111.
65 NAC, RG 8 1, 730:178. 
66  NAC, RG 8 1, 730:181. Record to Freer September 21, 1813.
I shall shortly require employment for the artificers under my command in this 
Dock Yard and it being his Excellency’s pleasure that a transport vessel be built beg 
leave to recommend the laying down a Brig either to serve as a transport, or as a ship of 
war, which vessel could immediately be brought to a state of planking, when her service 
could be determined--- Finding there are stores on hand sufficient for the equipment of 
two sloops of war I suggest that a ship, or brig of that class would be found to answer 
either of the above purposes
67 NAC, RG 8 1, 731:8-9. Yeo to Prevost  October 8, 1813. 
Having heard that your Excellency had ordered a vessel to be built independent 
of the ship, I beg leave to suggest and recommend her being a little larger for reasons I 
will submit to your Excellency.  Mr Record the builder informs me the difference of 
expense would not exceed three hundred pounds and that he could build the one or the 
other at the same time.  The Royal George from her general weak and defective state I 
am certain cannot keep the sea much longer without a thourough repair, the which would 
be attended with nearly as much experience and time as building a new ship.
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68NAC, RG 8 1, 731:8-9. Yeo to Prevost  October 8, 1813. 
69 NAC, RG 8 1, 731:29-34 O'Conor to Freer October 14 1813. 
This directions that a vessel of war and three gun boats should be laid down and 
constructed without delay…”  and the necessary materials be requisitioned.
70  NAC, RG 8 1, 731:35-39. O'Conor to Freer October 15, 1813.
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th Ins.’t signifying that 
the vessel which is preparing the to be laid down by Mr. Record and intended to have 
been a Brig shall a Ship of the following dimensions:  Length of Keel , One Hundred and 
Ten Feet;  Breadth Moulded, Thirty Six Feet;  Depth of Hold, Ten Feet and to acquaint 
you the same will be complied with.  As Mr Goudie will not fail seeing you on his way 
to Kingston a favourable opportunity will offer for suggesting to him the necessity of 
reducing at this season of the year,  the wages of the artificers employed to sane and 
resonable terms holding in consideration the working hours at present are one third less 
than at the time of their engagement.
The period being elapsed for which the other artificers were engaged they have 
not hesitated to declare their objection to working at wages so considerably less than the 
others receive though willing otherwise to admit the liberality of the government to 
them.
If the pay of the Artificers obtained through Mr. Goudie was reduced to what the 
others receive their wages would then be very liberal a cause of discontent removed and I 
have reason to hope that a little time would reconcile them to it, if not, we must place 
them on the same footing sooner than lose the services of any at such a crisis.
71 NAC, RG 8 1, 731:60-64  Yeo toPrevost October 22, 1813.  
On the subject of the former I can assure your excellency I have strong doubts as 
to the Enemy's having launched another Brig, tho the officer appears positive. 
I sincerely wish any efforts or persuasion of mine could cause a proper exertion 
to be made in our Dock Yard, or that I could hold onto any hope of the new ships being 
ready early in the spring but on the contrary I feel confident that unless your excellency 
causes some prompt and active measures to be taken not one of the ships will be 
finished.
I beg leave to submit to your excellency the propriety of having only one builder 
in the Yard whom the men will readily obey, at present Mr. Goudie’s men will not attend 
to Mr. Record and Mr. Record’s men will not without the same pay Mr. Goudie’s have, 
this is natural because both are paid by Government, but if Mr. Goudie could be 
prevailed on to Contract for Completing the large ships and him to Pay his workmen it 
would then be his Interest to finish her in the shortest possible time he could have no 
object in interfering with Mr. Record and Mr Records Men would no longer have cause 
to be dissatisfied with their wages as whatever Mr. Goudie ‘s men might have, it would 
be a private agreement between individuals.
If Mr. Goudie comes up under any other circumstances I foresee nothing but 
cabals and difficulty for in my opinion he is not to be relied upon unless bound down by 
an agreement.
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72 NAC, RG 8 1,731: 86-91 O'Conor October 30, 1813.  
I apprehend you almost dread the sight of a letter from me, lest you should hear 
more of our discontented artificers—who aware how very important their services are, 
and fully acquainted what Government pay on Lake Champlain together with their 
privations here think demands however unrealistic must be complied with, appraised of, 
though scarcely believing their intentions serious of applying for an increase of wages, 
already extravagantly high, and feeling no additional pay, however exorbitant would 
procure further exertion from them – I had to consider and promptly decide on a plan 
suitable to their wishes as the same time best – calculated to promote much activity and 
economy, the public service, which desirable circumstances appears most likely to be 
effected by the accompanying contract submitted for his Excellency’s approval, any 
additional alteration he may please to direct will I am confident be acceded to, the 
working shipwrights are by a separate Instrument bound to the performance and 
fulfillment of this contract – an active ----- man is gone down to entice Shipwrights up, 
and will I have no doubt procure more reasonable expenses are promised to pay him and 
them.  I feel gratified at my success in this affair, from a conviction that under existing 
circumstances it is the only method of securing perhaps , either of the vessels being 
completed – that I may sincerely wish Mr. Goudie would undertake to complete the 
vessel laid down by him if not on the same terms higher prices may induce him – but this 
should be kept secret -- to prevent jealousies and discontent that would otherwise 
prevail.  
I am informed about twenty Shipwrights are on their way from Amherstburg with 
some officers of the yard, should the latter prove qualified to fill vacancies here it will 
afford me much pleasure to recommend them for his…
Terms of Records Contract
₤10 for then finding workmen & the ship & being completed by the 1st May 1814 --- 
₤1000 penalty for a failure in the performance of the agreement.
73NAC RG 8 1, 731:133-137  O'Conor November 24 1813.
74NAC RG 8 1,731:179, O'Conor to Prevost, December 17, 1813.
75This period is also covered in Jonathan Moore, Archaeological and Historical  
Investigations of Three War of 1812 Wrecks at Kingston Ontario.  (Report for Province 
of Ontario Licence to Conduct Archaeological Exploration or Fieldwork 1999-096 at 
Sites BdGd-6, BbGc-45 and BbGc-46), 2006.
76NAC RG 8 1, 732:54-55, O'Conor March 7, 1814.
77NAC RG 8 1, 682:246-247, Deposition of Robert Christie, March 24, 1814.
78John Le Couteur Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War Journal of Lieutenant John 
Le Couteur, 104th Foot, ed. Robert Graves (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 
159.
79NAC RG 8 1, 683:98, May 5, 1814.
80NAC RG 8 1, 732:99. April 6, 1814.
81NAC ADM 52, 3928 Princess Charlotte Master's Log.
82Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812 – 1814 
108
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 205.
83John Le Couteur Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War Journal of Lieutenant John 
Le Couteur, 104th Foot, ed. Robert Graves (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 
159.
84NAC RG 8 1,683, 1-5 Drummond to Prevost April 22, 1814.
85NAC, RG 8 1, 683:93-96 Drummond to Prevost May 3, 1814.
86NAC, RG 8 1, 683:105.
87NAC ADM 52, 3928, Princess Charlotte Master's Log. 
88NAC RG 8 1, 683 105-114 Drummond to Prevost May 7, 1814.
89Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812 – 1814 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 275.
90Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812 – 1814 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 278.
91Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812 – 1814 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 279-81.
92Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812 – 1814 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 280-283.
93Robert Malcomson, Warships of the Great Lakes 1754 – 1834 (Edison: Knickerbocker 
Press, 2001), 137.
94 Jonathan Moore, Archaeological and Historical Investigations of Three War of 1812 
Wrecks at Kingston Ontario.  (Report for Province of Ontario Licence to Conduct 
Archaeological Exploration or Fieldwork 1999-096 at Sites BdGd-6, BbGc-45 and 
BbGc-46, 2006), 22-25.
95NAS, GD51/2, 496, Drury to Melville, January 1, 1814.
96NAC, RG 8, 1, 731:131.
97PRO, ADM 1, 2737:100, Yeo to Croker, May 21, 1814.
98This topic was also discussed by Jonathan Moore, Archaeological and Historical  
Investigations of Three War of 1812 Wrecks at kingston Ontario.  (Report for Province 
of Ontario Licence to Conduct Archaeological Exploration or Fieldwork 1999-096 at 
Sites BdGd-6, BbGc-45 and BbGc-46, 2006), 6-7.
99 Robert Malcomson, Warships of the Great Lakes 1754 – 1834 (Edison: Knickerbocker 
Press, 2001), 102.
100 NAC, RG 8, 1, 732: 23.
101 NAC, RG 8, 1, 732: 25.
102 NAC RG 8 1, 732:153-54, Drummond to Prevost, April 26, 1814.
103 Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812 – 1814 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 253.
104PRO ADM 1, 2264: 397, Owen, November 5, 1815.
105NAC, RG 8, 1, 1221: 264-66, Prevost to Yeo, December 8, 1813.
106Jonathan Moore, Archaeological and Historical Investigations of Three War of 1812 
Wrecks at Kingston Ontario.  (Report for Province of Ontario Licence to Conduct 
Archaeological Exploration or Fieldwork 1999-096 at Sites BdGd-6, BbGc-45 and 
109
BbGc-46, 2006), 75.
107PRO ADM 1, 2262: 137, Thomas Strickland, March 23, 1815.
108PRO ADM.1, 1999: 106 August 29, 1820.  This is also discussed by Jonathan Moore, 
Archaeological and Historical Investigations of Three War of 1812 Wrecks at Kingston 
Ontario.  (Report for Province of Ontario Licence to Conduct Archaeological 
Exploration or Fieldwork 1999-096 at Sites BdGd-6, BbGc-45 and BbGc-46, 2006), 16.
109NAC, RG 8 1, 732: 97-103.
110NAC, RG 8 1, 732: 139-41.
111 Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812 – 1814 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 295.
112  NAC, RG 8 1, 732: 54-55, O’Conor to Freer, March 7, 1814.
113 Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812 – 1814 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 294-5.
114AO, Thomas Mossington Papers, I, undated memorandum.  From Jonathan Moore, 
Archaeological and Historical Investigations of Three War of 1812 Wrecks at Kingston 
Ontario.  (Report for Province of Ontario Licence to Conduct Archaeological 
Exploration or Fieldwork 1999-096 at Sites BdGd-6, BbGc-45 and BbGc-46, 2006), 13.
115Section 4.1 is based on research by Jonathan Moore and recorded in both Jonathan 
Moore, Archaeological and Historical Investigations of Three War of 1812 Wrecks at  
Kingston Ontario.  (Report for Province of Ontario Licence to Conduct Archaeological 
Exploration or Fieldwork 1999-096 at Sites BdGd-6, BbGc-45 and BbGc-46, 2006) and 
Jonathan Moore “Frontier Frigates and a Three Decker” unpublished manuscript.
116R. A. Preston, “The Fate of Kingston's Warships,” Historic Kingston 1 (1952), 4.
117R. A. Preston, “The Fate of Kingston's Warships,” Historic Kingston 1 (1952), 13.
118RMCA, Preston Papers, Box 5, Part 2, Preston to Stevens, October 12, 1960, Stevens 
to Preston, October 15, 1960.
119Jonathan Moore “Frontier Frigates and a Three Decker” unpublished manuscript.
120Susan M. Bazely, Preserve Our Wrecks (Kingston) Underwater Survey Licence No.  
88-42, unpublished report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Citizenship, Culture, & 
Recreation, 1988).
121Jonathan Moore, Archaeological and Historical Investigations of Three War of 1812 
Wrecks at Kingston Ontario.  (Report for Province of Ontario Licence to Conduct 
Archaeological Exploration or Fieldwork 1999-096 at Sites BdGd-6, BbGc-45 and 
BbGc-46, 2006),46-47.
122Ontario Ministry of Citizenship, Culture, and Recreation Licence to Conduct 
Archaeological Exploration Survey or Field Work  Licence No. 2000-112 
123J. Richard Steffy, Wooden Ship Building and the Interpretation of Shipwrecks (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1994),195.
124Howard Chappelle, The History of the American Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their  
Development (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1949), 296.
125Kevin Crisman, “The Construction of the Boscawen” The Bulletin of the Fort  
Ticonderoga Museum 14:6 (1985): 365-366. and
110
Chris Sabick, His Majesty's Hired Transport Schooner Nancy. (M.A. thesis, Texas 
A&M University, 2004) 102-3.
126NAC RG 8 1, 731:174.
127NAC ADM. 1999:106 Thomas Strickland August 29, 1820.
128 Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812 – 1814 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 242.
129NAC RG 8 1, 731: 133-137 Richard O'Conor to Noah Freer November 24, 1813.
130Howard Chappelle, The History of the American Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their  
Development (New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1949), 296.
131NAC ADM. 1999:106  Thomas Strickland August 29, 1820.
111
REFERENCES
Abbreviations
ADM British Admiralty Files
AO Archives of Ontario
CO Colonial Office
NAC National Archives of Canada
NAS National Archives of Scotland
RMCA Royal Military College Archives, Kingston
RG Record Group
PRO  Public Record Office, London
Primary Sources - Archival
AO, Thomas Mossington Papers, I, undated memorandum.
NAC, CO 42 146
NAC RG 8 1, 682
NAC RG 8 1, 683
NAC, RG 8 1, 729
NAC, RG 8 1, 730
NAC, RG 8 1, 731
NAC RG 8 1, 732
NAC, RG 8 1,1220
NAC, RG 8 1, 1221
NAC ADM 52
NAS GD51/2
Ontario Ministry of Citizenship, Culture, and Recreation Licence to Conduct 
Archaeological Exploration Survey or Field Work  Licence No. 2000-112.
PRO ADM.1, 1999
PRO ADM 1, 2262
PRO, ADM 1, 2264
PRO, ADM 1, 2737
RMCA, Preston Papers, Box 5, Part 2, Preston to Stevens, October 12, 1960, Stevens to 
Preston, October 15, 1960.
Quebec Gazette, November 29, 1810; July 11, 1811. 
112
Secondary Sources
Adams, Henry. The War of 1812. New York: Cooper Square Press, 1999.
Alexander Magoun, F. The United States Frigate Constitution and Other Historic Ships.  
New York: Bonanza Books, 1928.
Auchinleck,G., A History of the War between Great Britain and the United States of  
America During the Years 1812, 1813, and 1814. Toronto: Maclear and Co., 1855.
Bazely, Susan M. Preserve Our Wrecks Kingston Underwater Survey Licence No. 88-42, 
unpublished report Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Citizenship, Culture, & Recreation, 
1988.
Chappelle, Howard. The History of the American Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their 
Development. New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1949.
Crisman, Kevin “The Construction of the Boscawen,” The Bulletin of the Fort 
Ticonderoga Museum 14:6 (1985).
Ford Paul Leicester, ed. The Works of Thomas Jefferson. New York: G.P. Putnam and 
Sons, 1905.
Gardiner, Robert, ed. The Naval War of 1812. London: Chatham Publishing, 1998.
Hitsman, John Mackay. The Incredible War of 1812. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1999.
 Le Couteur, John. Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War Journal of Lieutenant John 
Le Couteur, 104th Foot. edited. by Robert Graves. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 
1994.
Leech, Samuel. “HMS Macedonian vs. USS United States” in Every Man Will Do His 
Duty: An Anthology of First Hand Accounts from the Age of Nelson 1793-1815 1st ed., 
edited by Dean King and John B.Hattendorf. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 
1997.
Malcomson, Robert.  Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812 – 1814. 
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998.
Malcomson, Robert. Warships of the Great Lakes 1754 – 1834. Edison: Knickerbocker 
Press, 2001.
113
Moore,Jonathan. Archaeological and Historical Investigations of Three War of 1812 
Wrecks at Kingston Ontario.  unpublished report for Province of Ontario Licence to 
Conduct Archaeological Exploration or Fieldwork 1999-096 at Sites BdGd-6, BbGc-45 
and BbGc-46, 2006.
Moore, Jonathan. Frontier Frigates and a Three-Decker: Wrecks of the Royal Navy’s 
Lake Ontario Squadron. unpublished manuscript.
Preston, R.A. “The Fate of Kingston's Warships,” Historic Kingston 1 (1952): 3-14.
Roosevelt, Theodore. The Naval War of 1812. New York: Random House Inc., 1999.
Sabick Chris, “His Majesty's Hired Transport Schooner Nancy.” M.A. thesis, Texas 
A&M University, 2004.
Steffy, J. Richard. Wooden Ship Building and the Interpretation of Shipwrecks. College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1994.
Tracy, Nicholas, ed. The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy 
at War Volume 5 1811-1815. London: Chatham Publishing, 1999.
114
APPENDIX A: WOOD SPECIES1
Wreck Name Timber Name Wood Name Wood Species
St. Lawrence
 Half-floor Rock elm Ulmus thomasii Sarg.
First futtock White Oak Quercus spp.
Limber strake White Oak Quercus spp.
Ceiling plank White Oak Quercus spp.
Hull planks White Oak Quercus spp.
Wreck Able (Kingston, ex Prince Regent)
Keelson White Oak Quercus spp.
Rider keelson White Oak Quercus spp.
Stern post White Oak Quercus spp.
Floor White Oak Quercus spp.
Floor chocks White Oak Quercus spp.
First futtock White Oak Quercus spp.
Limber strake White Oak Quercus spp.
Ceiling plank White Oak Quercus spp.
Hull plank White Oak Quercus spp.
Strake for fore mast step White Oak Quercus spp.
Main mast bolsters White Oak Quercus spp.
Wreck Baker (Burlington, ex Princess Charlotte)
Keelson White Oak Quercus spp.
Rider keelson White Oak Quercus spp.
Keel White Oak Quercus spp.
False keel Chestnut Castanea spp.
Stem White Oak Quercus spp.
Stern post White Oak Quercus spp.
Stern Knee White Oak Quercus spp.
Half floor White Oak Quercus spp.
Half floor cross chock White Oak Quercus spp.
First futtock chock White Oak Quercus spp.
First futtock White Oak Quercus spp.
Ceiling plank White Oak Quercus spp.
Hull plank Chestnut Castanea spp.
Wale White Oak Quercus spp.
1 Jonathan Moore, “Archaeological Investigations of the War of 1812 Wrecks at 
Kingston, Ontario”.
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY OF PRINCESS CHARLOTTE (BURLINGTON) IN 18202
Kinston Survey of His Majesty’s Ship 
Naval Yard Burlington of 42 guns, taken
August 29, 1820 afloat
Place where Particulars decayed, or 
that want repair
No of pieces
St.d L.d
Total Nature 
of 
Decay
Frame Timbers in hold
11 between L.D. 
and
        Upp. D.
12 Between 
Upp.D.
and 2.D. & Forec.
13 in the range of 
2.D. & Forec.
Transoms
Fashion pieces
Knightsheads
Hawse pieces
Keel
Deadwood
Keelson
Stem
Apron
Stemson
Sternpost
Innerpost
Sternson
34
50
35
25
1
2
38
46
36
31
4
72
96
71
51
6
Dry rot 
and 
defects 
from 
the bad 
quality 
of the 
timber
Hold Footwaling
Hooks
Crutches
Steps of Masts
Bulkheads
   def
bad
ective
Platforms Beams
Flat
2NAC ADM 1, 1999:106  Thomas Strickland August 29, 1820.
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Lower Deck Beams
Flat
Shelf Pieces
Clamps
Spirketting
Waterway
3 5 8
Upper Deck Beams
Flat
Shelf pieces
Clamp
Spirketting
Waterway
Riding bitts
8
partl
deca
deca
4
y defe
yed
yed
12
ctive
2. Deck and 
Forec.
Beams
Flat
Shelf pieces
Clamp
Spirketting
Waterway
Catheads
12
must
deca
deca
15
be shi
yed
yed
27
fted
Without 
Board
Wales
Plank of bottom
Topsides
Knee of the head
Channels
Defe
Partl
   all
ctive
y def
bad
ective
From the foregoing defects we are of the opinion she will
Require a large repair,  which may be performed in 
18 months after taken in hand; an estimate
 of the charge thereof, and providing her with
 furniture and stores, is as follows, viz.  –
For the hull        -       
14 iron fastening
15 masts and yards
16 furniture and 
stores
17                   Total - 
Mat. Workm. Total
2551
749
170
-
4082
-
180
-
6633
749
350
-
3470 4262 7732
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APPENDIX C: CONVERSION CHART FOR FRAME SET DESIGNATIONS 
BETWEEN SURVEY AND NAVAL TRADITION
Survey Traditional Survey Traditional
1 M 30 16
2 L 31 17
3 K 32 18
4 J 33 19
5 I 34 20
6 H 35 21
7 G 36 22
8 F 37 23
9 E 38 24
10 D 39 25
11 C 40 26
12 B 41 27
13 A 42 28
14 midship 43 29
15 1 44 30
16 2 45 31
17 3 46 32
18 4 47 33
19 5
20 6
21 7
22 8
23 9
24 10
25 11
26 12
27 13
28 14
29 15
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